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“The purpose of development is to offer people more options.
One of their options is access to income—not as an end in itself but as a means to
acquiring human well-being. But there are other options as well, including long life,
knowledge, political freedom, personal security, community participation
and guaranteed human rights. People cannot be reduced to a single dimension
as economic creature.”
UNDP, Human Development Report, 1990
Abstract
This paper explores some of the dimensions related to poverty and exclusion,
by defining a Relational Capability Index (RCI) which focuses on the quality
of relationships among people and on their level of relational empowerment.
This index is rooted in a relational anthropology; it insists on the quality
of the social fabric and of interpersonal relations as a key aspect of human
development. As a multidimensional index, the RCI includes integration into
networks, private relations and civic commitments. We provide an axiomati-
zation of a family of multidimensional indexes. This axiomatic viewpoint fills
the gap between theories of justice and poverty measurements. By means
of illustration, we apply three different versions of the RCI, which are el-
ements of this family, to the measurement of the impact of oil companies
on local communities in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) and to national surveys
(Afrobarometer).
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes, both theoretically and empirically, to the measurement of
multidimensional aspects of development. This line of inquiry has been initiated by
Amartya Sen (Sen, 1999) and expanded by the UNDP (Human Development Report),
the Human Development and Capability Association and the Oxford Poverty and Devel-
opment Initiative (OPHI). In 2010, the OPHI and UNDP introduced a Multidimensional
Poverty Index which entails three components: health, education, and living standards.1
The justification for the choice of these components is threefold: the areas are of key im-
portance in terms of human development and Millenium Development Goals; a consensus
has been reached on the importance of these components from a practical perspective
(thanks to a participative methodology) and from a theoretical one (universal recognition
of health, education and living conditions as core dimensions of human rights); and there
are several data constraints facing the field. The initiators of this index, however, under-
line the importance of focusing on other human capabilities as well. Alkire and Santos
(2010), for instance, emphasize that “a key priority for future work on multidimensional
poverty must be gathering more and better data around core areas such as informal work,
empowerment, safety from violence, and human relationship (social capital and respect
versus humiliation). This will enable empirical exploration of whether such dimensions
add value to a multidimensional poverty measure.” The present paper explores some
of these later dimensions, by defining a new index —the Relational Capability Index—
which focuses on the quality of relationships among people and on their level of relational
empowerment. We discuss the philosophical roots of such a measurement concept, as well
as its methodological challenges. As an illustration, we apply this index to measuring
the impact of oil companies on local communities in the Niger Delta (Nigeria), and to
national surveys (Afrobarometer).
Our perspective is rooted in a specific understanding of human development through
the expansion of (individual) capabilities to share flourishing relationships. Human rela-
tionships are at the core of human life—this is the starting point of our work. Arguably,
emphasizing, as we do, the relational aspect of social life amounts to adopting a norma-
tive standpoint about what makes our lives “human”. We shall see, however, that such
a prejudice is in line with, for instance, the recent work by Nussbaum. On the other
hand, however, we put the accent on capabilities, i.e., on “what people are actually able
to do and to be” (De Munck and Zimmermann, 2008; Nussbaum, 2003), including access
to resources, agency (capacity to make free choices), and functionings (achievements).
Our approach therefore puts social networks at the center of the very concept of human
development but, at the same time, acknowledges the diversity of personal and collective
values and ends. In particular, we refrain from imposing a single view of what it should
mean to have flourishing relationships. This is reflected in the specific methodology
we develop in order to aggregate the various dimensions of our index into a single real
number.
1See Alkire and Foster (2008), Alkire and Santos (2010) and UNDP (2010).
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The paper proceeds as follows. We first present our relational approach based on
individual capabilities in view of the various concepts of social development already ex-
amined in the literature (2). The following section then proposes a set of dimensions and
indicators entering into the construction of ourRCI, and proceeds with the aggregation of
such dimensions into the RCI, as partly inspired by the Multidimensional Poverty Index
methodology (cutoffs, means, and weights) (3). Section 4 details the axiomatic model
that justifies the way the index dimensions have been aggregated, and the index’s proper-
ties. The last section presents two empirical applications (5). The case of areas impacted
by oil extraction in the Niger Delta, in Nigeria, illustrates the practical relevance of the
RCI. Its computation at a national level by means of the Afrobarometer shows that our
index is intuitive, simple to use, and can be applied with good effect to real-world data.
2 Concepts—towards a relational development
Today’s definitions of poverty are often framed in terms of the (lack of) capacity of a
person to participate in the society in which they live. For instance, the notions of social
inclusion, social integration or participation have become widespread in international
institutions such as UNDP or the World Bank. Similarly, the World Summit for Social
Development in Copenhagen in 1995 (Marlier and Atkinson, 2010) describes the “process
by which efforts are made to ensure equal opportunities—that everyone, regardless of
their background, can achieve their full potential in life.” The goals of social integration
and inclusive society depict “a more stable, safe and just society for all”, in which every
individual, each with rights and responsibilities, has an active role to play” (United
Nations, 1995, par 66).
This approach in terms of social inclusion is a significant step towards a more satis-
factory understanding of poverty, as opposed to the definitions relating to financial and
real assets that were previously prevailing. It enables a view of poverty as a complex
set of deprivations: malnutrition and bad health, lack of access to the job market, low
mobility, low social capital, low skills and incomplete education, etc.
However, viewing poverty as a lack of social inclusion is not immune to ambiguity.
For instance, the World Bank’s “Poverty Reduction Strategy” and the Post-Washington
Consensus claim that their aim is to ensure everybody is able to participate in the
market economy (which is seen as an opportunity to overcome poverty); such a purpose
rarely involves any criticism of the deadlocks of this deregulated market economy, and
only (monetary) compensations of the negative side effects of structural adjustments are
envisioned. Moreover, most recommendations are phrased as if there was an implicit
discipline of integration, a “duty” to accept the programs under scrutiny: the poor who
do not seize the opportunities on offered might even be sanctioned, inasmuch they will
suffer from a moral stigmatization of being the “lazy poor.” Finally, within this context,
the idea of social development is usually linked with the search for social investments
(human and social capital); it is about competitive societies and integrated national
economies.
Consequently, this understanding of poverty often leads to the idea that poverty re-
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duces to a lack of social capital—where “social capital” is “a variety of different notions
that have two elements in common: [...] all consist[ing] of some aspect of social structures,
and facilitate[ing] certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within
the structure” (Coleman, 1988). Both Bourdieu (1994) and Coleman (1988) consider so-
cial capital as relational resources which can be accumulated over a lifetime through
various “social investments”, and give access to goods or opportunities. In our view, this
approach has two main limits. First, it is a “capitalist” approach (accumulation as an
advantage “against” other people) which shows a very partial aspect of social connected-
ness, inasmuch as it is blind to the positive externality implied by socialization. Second,
this instrumental approach cannot seize social relationships as an accomplishment and a
goal for itself.
2.1 Social connectedness as a public good
Beyond the ethical criticisms, the social capital approach does not allow for a full
comprehension of the functioning and outcomes of social interconnection. Representing
it as a (rare and) valuable resource overshadows its principal characteristic as a public
good: its capacity to be shared without impoverishing its “owner” (like knowledge).
Therefore, our approach is closely related to the traditional view of social capital as being
the positive effect of social closure—i.e., the presence of cohesive ties—in promoting a
normative environment that facilitates trust and cooperation between actors (Coleman
(1990, 1988)). As stressed by Coleman (1988, p.119), “a property shared by most forms
of social capital that differentiates it from other forms of capital is its public good aspect:
the actor or actors who generate social capital ordinarily capture only a small part of
its benefits, a fact that leads to underinvestment in social capital.” It is this public good
aspect that we aim to capture, as we suggest that the relational payoff of an actor must
depend not only upon the number of neighbors they have, but also upon their respective
connectedness with these neighbors.
This means, in particular, that producing and consuming goods and services should
be viewed as a means towards the maximization of people’s relational capability. This
is evident—and has already been acknowledged by economists—for club commodities
(Ellickson et al. (1999, 2001)); i.e. for commodities whose value increases with the number
of people connected to them (such as the phone, Internet, Wikipedia, Google, Facebook,
Second Life, etc.). For instance, if Robinson Crusoe were the only person on Earth
to own a phone, the phone would be useless; yet if he can talk with 6 billion people,
the value of his phone becomes almost infinite. In a sense, our approach amounts to
saying that most commodities and services share the same fundamental property as club
commodities: Their value arises from the quantity and the quality of the relationships
that their consumption makes possible, as well as from the richness of the relationships
that were necessary to produce them. Most people do not watch TV “because” TV
programs are intrinsically interesting, but “because” it is a way to enter into relationships
with people who have watched the same programs (hence allowing them to share the
same information about the world, dream about the same “Californian way of life,” etc.).
Think about it: would you even listen to Monteverdi, read Hegel or admire Turners’
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masterpieces if you were absolutely sure that nobody cared about them and nobody ever
would? Of course, there are exceptions: even before meeting Friday, Robinson Crusoe
needs some basic items in order to survive on his island—non-polluted oxygen, drinkable
water, vitamins, natural sunlight, etc. Let us call these “basic goods.” Our viewpoint is
therefore that, apart from a few basic goods (whose list should be fixed and from which
many people in the world are still deprived), all commodities and services are “club
goods” (or “club bads”). Some examples may facilitate understanding of this renewed
approach: for instance, “blood diamonds,” whose production has lead to a war in Sierra
Leone and the exploitation of children, should have a negative value regardless of the
subsequent use rich Northern households make of them. Conversely, “fair trade” can be
viewed as a (still ambiguous) first step towards the integration of relational capability
into the price of marketed commodities, where consumers buy coffee not only “because”
of its “intrinsic taste” (which, from our viewpoint, is closely related to the relationships
entertained during the time spent, for instance, at breakfast, when drinking coffee with
family) but “because,” by doing so, they learn the story of the Columbian producer of
coffee whom they choose to sustain. Numerous situations are quite ambivalent and need
a close analysis: an activity such as tourism, for instance, indicates, at first glance, the
triumph of relationships over the narcissistic pleasure of consuming commodities. On
the other hand, sexual tourism, such as that in South-East Asia, shows that “touristic
relationships” may induce major deprivations. Obviously, this approach leads us far
away from the libertarian Weltanschauung claiming that everything that receives a “free
price” ipso facto becomes a legitimate market commodity. In particular, it leads us to
consider the idea that markets and private contracts should be re-embedded within their
surrounding society (Polanyi, 1957; Porter and Craig, 2004).
2.2 Social cohesion
In line with the Polanyian criticism of the above-described inclusive liberal society,
the notion of social cohesion states that “a socially cohesive society is one where all groups
have a sense of belonging, participation, inclusion, recognition and legitimacy.”
According to Bernard (1999), social cohesion entails a set of relationships in economic,
political and socio-cultural spheres at the same time. These relations are can be of two
kinds: formal relationships define the passive integration of people in a society through
access to resources, integration into networks, and rights and entitlements. These are
what Sen calls “resources” and “entitlements” (Sen, 1999). On the other hand, substantial
relations define the active commitment of individuals in social interactions that express
achievements of their capabilities. This is what Sen calls “functionings”.
From the perspective of the capability approach, to which this paper adheres, we can
refine Bernard’s typology of social cohesion.
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Domains Formal relationships : Substantial relationships :
Resources; Commitment in relationships;
Passive integration into networks; Functionings.
Rights and entitlements.
Economic Insertion/Exclusion Equality/Inequality
or Material Relational assets; Equality in chance and equality in
Access to market, jobs; conditions: effective redistribution system,
Access to infrastructures and public social mobility.
services (health, education);
Access to social services.
Sociocultural Acceptance/Rejection Affiliation/Isolation
Equality in rights; Social interactions, love, friendship;
Non-discrimination; Share of common values;
Tolerance in differences, pluralism. Trust, feeling of belonging to a community
(as opposed to social isolation).
Political Legitimacy/Illegitimacy Participation/Passivity
Maintenance of public and private Involvement in public affairs and/or third sector;
institutions acting as mediators Vote (as opposed to political disenchantment).
(as opposed to social chaos);
Political rights (vote, meeting, expression);
Trust in institutions.
Table 1: Dimensions of social cohesion (Bernard 1999) from the perspective of the
Relational Capability Approach
Social cohesion creates conditions for better interpersonal, as well as mediated re-
lations, within a society (Kuehnast and Dudwick, 2004). Several surveys have recently
highlighted the tight relationship between the level of income inequalities within coun-
tries and the level of social and health problems. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show
that huge inequalities (such as those experienced today in many industrialized countries)
have negative side effects for the whole population (not only for the poorest) in terms of
sanitation and social diseases. In addition, the richest people across all countries are also
those who pollute more and bear a huge responsibility towards future generations (Gi-
raud and Renouard, 2012). As a consequence, there is a link between fostering relational
capabilities, and public and private policies aimed at reducing wealth inequalities.
This discussion suggests that our relational capability approach entails not only “for-
mal” aspects, in the Rawlsian sense (Rawls, 1971) of aspects that can be discussed without
having to agree on any substantial definition of the “common good,” if any. Clearly, our
emphasis on human relations also involves substantial aspects, which have to be grounded
in some underlying anthropology—to which we now turn.
2.3 A relational anthropology
Each development indicator is underpinned by a certain conception of the human
condition and of what a “good life” means. We defend a perspective that stresses the
essentially relational and social nature of every person. A flourishing life, in this regard,
6
is a life that enables a person to develop fruitful relations with themselves and with their
fellow human beings in a given political community. Development is then understood
above all as a matter of fostering the conditions for such a flourishing life. This does
not mean that basic material needs and income fall outside the scope of our understand-
ing of development: rather, they are incorporated as means towards people’s relational
capability.
Let us first contrast this standpoint with the utilitarian tradition before turning to
a discussion of the relationships between our relational capability approach, and that of
Nussbaum (2000)2.
2.3.1 Utilitarianism and beyond
Utilitarianism is a philosophical line of thought whose aim was defined by Bentham
(1815) as maximizing the utility or happiness of the greatest possible number of people.
It has had many important consequences on reflections about morality: it is a conse-
quentialist perspective which focuses on the outcomes of an action, and has little regard
for its intentions. Can we find some intellectual resources within the utilitarian school of
thought which would enable it to counter the maximization of personal utility and the
sacrifice of the freedoms and capabilities of the most vulnerable? Indeed, such an internal
criticism has been made by John Stuart Mill (1861), who developed his own account of
utilitarianism.
Not only does Mill leave the possibility of altruism open, but he even defines utilitarian
ethics as the effort to shape people’s altruism and to find happiness within it, “so that not
only may he be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently
with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote
the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and
the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human
being’s sentient existence” (Mill, 1861, chpt.2). Relationship to others is essential for
Mill. His arguments consist in emphasizing the importance of education to instill in
one’s character the feeling of being united to one’s fellow human beings. What shapes a
society is the importance and the nature of the bonds between people. Human progress
is rooted in the strengthening of social bonds and the care for the others’ interests.
Even more, the challenge is to help people discover that looking for the good of others
is a source of personal flourishing and happiness. Virtue has to become desirable, if
understood as the personal development of intellectual and moral abilities and being
linked with the search for the good of others and for the common good. Nevertheless,
aside from this self-detachment and this impetus toward the common good, establishing
safeguards, through external legal constraints, regulations and sanctions, is necessary in
order to guarantee the realization of common interests.
Mill fights against a utilitarian conception centered on the maximization of individual
pleasures, while refusing a moral perspective sacrificing sensible inclinations. The idea is
2An expanded version of this analysis is presented in Renouard (2011)
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to orient the individual desire towards the care of others, so that the search for personal
happiness and the quest for the good of others merge. Mill stresses that the highest
level of self-fulfillment and happiness is reached when relating to others. “The utilitarian
morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good
for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good [. . . ]
The only self-renunciation that it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of
the means of happiness, of others” (Mill, 1861, chpt.2). This is not to be interpreted
as the possibility of sacrificing the least productive people. Mill argues in favor of the
education of every citizen, and in particular of the elites, for the well being of others, and
for the eradication of poverty. In this regard, Mill’s view joins the Kantian perspective,
according to which morality encompasses a disinterested relationship with others (Kant,
1785). However, Mill takes into account human psychology: the aim is not a total self-
renunciation of the individual, but his fulfillment in the care of both the others’ good
and the common good. Finally, relational anthropology defines human relationships
as the substance of human identity: being is relational and a flourishing human life is
experienced in autonomy and interdependence.
2.3.2 Relational autonomy and interdependence
Relational anthropology focuses on the relational capabilities of each person as con-
stituting the core of human condition. The link between the individual and the collective
can be elucidated in the sense that defining a person through the quality of the relations
they have with other human beings does not mean that the individual is denied their
autonomy and freedom of choice. We combine a relational ontology, which refuses on
considering the human being as an isolated atom, with an ethical individualism, which
recognizes the moral responsibility of each person. Indeed, as acknowledged by Dreze
and Sen (2002, p.6) or Robeyns (2005, p.108), “A commitment to ethical individualism is
not incompatible with an ontology that recognizes the connections between people, their
social relations, and their social embedment.” We call “relational autonomy” this combi-
nation of a relational ontology and an ethical individualism. Our relational starting point
means that, like Marion Young (Young, 2000, p.231), we depart from an understanding
of freedom as mere independence and non-interference. But our ethical individualism
forces us to go beyond Young’s social ideal, which consists of shaping all kinds of re-
lations, within the family as well as within society, so as to allow each individual to
maximize their private goals. In contrast, relational autonomy means that everybody
is invited to contribute to some common goals that can, in turn, affect their individual
objectives.
2.4 Relationships and the capabilities approach
Our perspective is rooted in a liberal view, which stresses the freedoms and rights of
each individual. In this regard, we focus on the capabilities, rather than the functionings,
of each citizen. Following Sen, we argue that every society has to enable each individual
to make choices she has reasons to value (Sen, 1999). As shown above, we put an
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emphasis on the social condition of every person. We combine this liberal perspective
with an Aristotelian standpoint that gives an account of substantial aspects of human
development Aristotle (50BC).
Our relational capability brings together several dimensions necessary for a flourishing
human life from the list of central capabilities given by Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 2000),
among which are emotions and affiliation. Emotions and affiliation are defined as follows:
• Emotion: “Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves;
to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love,
to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s
emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic
events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of
human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)”
• Affiliation: “Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction;
to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that
situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this
capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of
affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)”
Two ideas advocated by Nussbaum are of major importance regarding relational ca-
pability: her invitation to let public policy focus on the capabilities of individuals and
not on their functionings; and her emphasis on affiliation (Nussbaum, 2002, p.134). The
present definition of relational capability complements Nussbaum’s attempt to define a
“politics of care” in three different ways: first, we give priority to relational capability as
being the core of a truly human life. Thus, we follow Sen in his emphasis on freedom, but
freedom is understood, here, as autonomy and interdependence.3 Secondly, the personal
dimension (the immediate relationship to others as fellow human beings) is linked with
the political/civic dimension (the mediated relationship to others as socii through insti-
tutions). On the one hand, any human being is immediately embedded in, and partly
shaped by, their political society. Conversely, interpersonal relations contribute to trans-
forming political rules and structures. Thirdly, we aim to capture the capability to form
relationships within a group (bonding) and between groups (bridging). Bonding deals
with social cohesion and with the implementation of a complex equality (Walzer) be-
tween citizens of a same political community or the same company. Bridging entails the
consideration of relations between different citizens or groups from different communities
or states.
3This understanding of freedom is in accordance with Nussbaum (2003, p.44) where it is stressed
that the capability approach implies limiting certain freedoms for certain people in order to diminish
inequalities in capacity.
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2.5 Bonding and bridging
Burt (1997, p.340) defines social capital as the “information and control advantages
of being the broker in relations between people otherwise disconnected in social struc-
ture.” This structural hole argument is reflected, here, in our definition of an actor’s
relational payoff, inasmuch as this payoff increases together with the density of the vari-
ous otherwise-disconnected components of the social network that an actor is able to link
together. We do not restrict social capital to brokerage opportunities: doing so would
lead an actor to overevaluate links with disconnected people while, here, an actor also
benefits from the various relationships among her neighbors. The same could be said
from Granovetter’s (1985) understanding of social capital in terms of weak ties: if one
interprets such “weak ties” as links among components that are otherwise poorly inter-
connected, then, again, this feature is captured by the RC, but reflects only one aspect
of the richness of the relational payoff.
On the other hand, we do not share Coleman’s (1988) final pessimism over the un-
derinvestment in social capital. On the contrary, our starting point is to hypothesize
that most people’s behavior can be understood as seeking to maximize something akin
to the relational payoff. Moreover, Coleman claims (Coleman, 1988, p.101) that “the
function identified by the concept of social capital is the value of these aspects of so-
cial structure to actors as resources that they can use to achieve their interests.” Again,
we do not agree with this instrumentalist point of view in the sense that, according to
the position adopted in this paper, relationships are not considered by an actor as an
auxiliary means to serve exogenous goals: creating and maintaining relationships within
a dense network of neighbors is the actor’s goal, with respect to which everything else
(commodities, money, power, etc.) should serve as an instrument.
Burt (1992) has challenged the widespread idea that societies belonging to a denser
network should experience faster development: this can be illustrated by the idea of a
tribe of people, living on an isolated island, entirely disconnected from the rest of the
world. Burt has thus suggested that “structural holes” should play a role in transmitting
new ideas or new ways of life, so that their frequency should serve as a criterion of the
ability of a group to experience development. Our opinion is that, behind this debate,
there are two, partly contradictory, anthropological pictures: on the one hand, a rather
“communitarian” viewpoint will tend to favor the density (and quality) of relationships
within one’s immediate neighborhood; on the other hand, a more “libertarian” point of
view will tend to put the accent on the competition among individuals, and hence on
the ability of an agent to grasp new information from various sources with whom the
individual does not aim to entertain strong, intense relationships.
Our own understanding of relational capability lies somewhere in between both ap-
proaches. Indeed, adopting Burt’s approach in a unilateral way would neglect the density-
quality of networks: “structural holes” can be useful only if they make it possible to
connect two, perhaps far distant but otherwise highly dense, small worlds. This is why
we distinguish between several levels of relationships—integration into social networks,
private relations, political commitments (see the three pillars of subsection 2.6.1 below).
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2.6 Political perspectives
2.6.1 RC and its three pillars
We distinguish three different dimensions of relational capabilities: the ability to
be integrated into networks; private ties; and civic commitments. Each dimension deals
with a different kind of possible inclusion/exclusion within a society. Building on the
distinction between economic, cultural and political aspects of social cohesion (Bernard,
1999) and justice (Fraser, 2009), we now show that each of the dimensions of relational
capability implies the consideration of a certain type of inclusion. The first dimension
of exclusion is socio-economic, and can be related to our first dimension—integration
into networks: this can be illustrated by the idea of somebody who has no job and who
has little access to information and to transport, and is thus deprived and somehow
excluded from relational material networks. Looking for the improvement of this first
socio-economic dimension means looking for a better distribution of relational assets, as
well as job opportunities and transportation means. The second dimension of exclusion is
cultural/social, and corresponds to our second dimension—private relations: for instance,
a person who feels that they are not loved by their family, who has no friends or who
cannot rely on others in case of trouble, is socially excluded. This has to do with the
lack of recognition and with the isolation they experience. A condition for the inclusion
of a person consists in their social and cultural recognition. The third dimension of
exclusion is political, and links to our third dimension—civic commitments. A person
who cannot vote and who cannot take part in their community/society life is suffering
from discrimination and a lack of control over their political destiny. A key issue related
to civic inclusion is the ability to participate in social and public life, or to be represented
at different political levels.
On the one hand, our index builds on Nussbaum’s perspective concerning central
capabilities: by adopting cut-offs below which an individual is considered as deprived,
we implicitly defend the idea that a certain minimum threshold has to be looked for in
each dimension of one’s social life. However, we stress the idea, which was well expressed
by Walzer (1983), that a condition for self respect is the recognition of a person in at least
one sphere of their existence. This will be reflected in the way in which we aggregate the
three pillars of the RCI.
2.6.2 Can we compare relational capabilities?
Measuring and comparing relational capabilities across countries faces an obvious
criticism: as the criteria for high-quality relations will vary a great deal between cultures,
is it possible and legitimate to compare them? There are four reasons why we find such
comparisons legitimate, despite their obvious methodological challenges:
Firstly, we have defined relational capabilities as having a link with a relational
ontology that has a universal perspective. We argue that a human life is human because of
the ability to form positive relationships with fellow human beings and with the cosmos,
in the context of a given society. Even though the content given to the equality of
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these relations will vary across cultures, we can defend a thin universalism (Walzer,
1994) that combines the uniqueness of every person and their interdependency with
others. Defining the relational identity of a person consists in refusing both solipsism
and collectivism. As stated above, we plead for a combination of relational anthropology
and ethical individualism.
Secondly, we define three components which are subject to basic formal agreement
across cultures, through an overlapping consensus (Nussbaum, 2000; Rawls, 1971). More-
over, as we focus on capabilities, rather than functionings, as a political goal, we do not
impose a single way of implementing relational capabilities; we only suggest that every
human being has to be entitled to be integrated into networks, to nurture rich private
relations and to take part in civic life.
Thirdly, the way in which we calculate the RCI gives all the more weight to a dimen-
sion than a person is better off in it. This is in line with Walzer’s suggestion of a justice
criterion for our complex and pluralist societies: the objective consists of attaining soci-
eties in which all citizens have self-respect; this stems from self-esteem, which is achieved
through the recognition of every person in a given sphere of life.
One characteristic of unfair societies is the domination of a small group of people
in all spheres. Nevertheless, Walzer does not take into account the criteria for a fair
distribution of goods in every sphere. As far as relational capabilities are concerned, we
defend the idea that each person should be entitled to a minimum in terms of access
to networks, private relations and civic commitments; in this regard, we endorse the
threshold perspective defended by Nussbaum. But we also defend the Walzerian idea
that the components are partially substitutable. As a consequence, we do not claim that
all the spheres always have, or ought to have, the same weight across cultures.
Fourthly, we promote a diachronic analysis which pays particular attention to the
compared evolution of and between countries. In this sense, we are less interested in the
static comparison between different contexts than on the ways in which situations evolve.
3 Dimensions and indicators of relational capability
3.1 Constructing a multidimensional poverty index
Two distinct approaches of index methodology can be found in the literature. One
is related to the normative construction of indexes, the second is related to data-driven
indexes. Normative indexes are theoretically based and do not depend on the data con-
sidered. Data-driven indexes are computed according to the statistical significance of
components.
A normative computation of indexes is the most frequently used within multidimen-
sional approaches to poverty. A large body of literature has been inspired by the Alkire-
Foster method (Alkire and Foster, 2008) 4. It consists of an arithmetical aggregation of
4 See, for instance, Alkire and Seth (2008), Santos and Ura (2008), and Batana (2008) computing
multidimensional poverty index (MPI), and UNDP Europe & CIS (2011) computing a multidimensional
social exclusion index.
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three dimensions of poverty that are theoretically defined. Each dimension is an equally-
weighted average of components, and is also equally weighted in the index computation.
Each component represents one aspect of deprivation. Identifying the poor first requires
the definition of a poverty cutoff for each component. The index is then computed as
an arithmetical mean of dimensions. Second, a cross-dimensional cutoff is defined: an
individual is considered poor when their index is higher than a poverty line.
Data-driven indexes provide a less consistent field. One might differentiate data-
driven indexes based on cardinal information from data-driven indexes derived from
ordinal information. The former are primarily built using data analysis processes, which
can be distinguished into two sets: descriptive and explanatory models (Krishnakumar
and Nagar, 2008). Indexes of Social Development (InSocDev) are built by combining
these two approaches, as described by Dickes et al. (2010) and then Acket et al. (2011).
Their aim is to provide a multidimensional index of social cohesion. Data are selected
on Bernard (1999) and Chan et al.’s (2006) theoretical grounding. Multidimensional
Scaling (MDS), as a descriptive analysis, is first used to select dimensions of the index.
Then, an explanatory analysis is driven using a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA),
which confirms the hierarchical structure provided by MDS. The final index is computed
with an arithmetical aggregation. Data-driven indexes based on ordinal information are
convincingly applied by Foa and Tanner (2011), who build a composite index from a
number of social indicators, and deal with the drawbacks of missing data using matching
percentile methodology. Each component is standardized, and computed using the five-
year values around the anchor year. The authors focus on the rank—hence, on ordinal
information—in order to compute the index. A match list is generated, and the input
list is composed by the sub-index values computed. Then, the score of a country is com-
puted by comparing the input to the match list according to its rank. The index score is
obtained using a recursive process until convergence is achieved for the countries scores.
As the first aim of our index is comparative, at both micro- and macro-levels, we
chose to implement it normatively. Poverty is considered as having multidimensional
bases, some of which are ordinal. We describe here an index Pi measuring K dimensions
of poverty across a population of N individuals. Let 1− xi,k indicate the deprivation of
individual i in dimension k.
3.2 Choice of dimensions
We distinguish three dimensions of these relational capabilities, considering the dif-
ferent spheres of life (economic, personal and civic/political (Walzer, 1983)):
• to be integrated into networks;
• to have specific attachments to others, including friendship and love;
• to commit to a project within a group, which aims at serving a common good or a
social interest; to take part in decision-making in a political society.
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1. Integration into networks
Integration into networks is the first component of relational capability. From the
first network in which a newborn is integrated—i.e. their family—to the community
that gathers around the deceased person, human life is spent in networks. At this stage,
we consider imposed and inherited networks, as well as chosen networks. Part of our
identity forms through given networks, and part of it through our voluntary commitment
to others (Coleman, 1988; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Lack of freedom, which is the
very definition of prison, is a means of preventing people from belonging to networks
that constitute social life. Similarly, exclusion consists of the absence or the weakness
of participation in networks due to isolation and the inability to escape it (Boltanski
and Chiapello, 1999). The lack of relational capability can be measured through a weak
participation in networks, whether institutional or not.
The indicators we use to calculate our index are: the number of people in the house-
hold, employment status (i.e. whether the person has a stable job with professional re-
lations), access to transport, and access to information/relational assets (mobile phone,
radio, TV).
Two aspects of this first pillar of the RCI deserve specific comments:
• Employment: OECD’s report on social cohesion (Society at glance: OECD 2005;
2011) considers employment and unemployment as factors of “self-sufficiency,” that
is “active participation in the economy and society, and autonomy in activities of
daily living.” Indeed, employment highlights people’s capacity of to be financially
independent, but is also a major factor of formal integration into professional net-
works and an opportunity of daily socialization (Paugham and Russell, 2000).
From the same perspective, the UNDP’s Human Poverty Index for high-income
OECD countries (1997) and the Leaken indicators on poverty and social exclusion,
defined by the European Council (HPI-2 2001), consider long-term unemployment
as a major indicator of social exclusion.
• Relational assets: A number of indicators consider ownership of a telephone, TV,
car or computer as indicators of the households’ level of equipment (Social Devel-
opment Index: Ray (2008); Multidimensional Poverty Index: Alkire and Santos
(2010)). Rather than private ownership, RCI focuses on access to transportation
and communication goods. Indeed, such resources allow the enlargement of net-
works, access to new opportunities (commuting, short- or long-distance migration)
and, more broadly speaking, entering into the dynamics of modernity and global-
ization. Being aware of the political, social or cultural news is also a factor of social
integration, and a capacity to develop shared references with others.
2. Private relations
The second dimension of relational capability concerns feelings for others—namely
friendship and love—in an interpersonal relationship. Human growth is favored by the
quality of love a human being receives and gives (Nussbaum, 2000). This love may be
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more or less exclusive; it implies the relation between two free persons in the above-defined
sense. Love is the highest expression of human freedom as autonomy and interdepen-
dence. We measure this aspect using different features: by whom a person feels he/she
is loved, the number of close friends, and the number and the nature of the persons to
whom the individual can turn in case of difficulties (financial, professional, etc.).
The quality of interpersonal relationships, the level of trust within an organization
and respect for the private life of its members are also of interest when assessing this
dimension of relational capability. This is related to the importance given to human
capital and to the human quality of the leaders within a given institution (George, 2003).
3. Civic commitments (participation)
The third dimension consists in the civic commitments of an individual; i.e., her
voluntary commitment to others for a specific project concerning a common good or
a collective interest. It implies participation in the decision-making process within a
political community. We focus here on chosen networks and, more specifically, on personal
commitment in society. This commitment can take different forms: political, social,
cultural, and associative (Alkire, 2002; Nussbaum, 2003). The importance of any such
commitment is closely related to the definition of a fair society as one that promotes a
complex equality (Walzer, 1983) among citizens: complex equality implies the assessment
of the capability shared by anybody in a given community to be recognized in one or
another sphere of their life; this recognition is facilitated via active and autonomous
involvement in a social network.
This commitment to different networks in a pluralist society can be captured by
several indexes: political vote, participation of everyone—including the worse off—in the
decision-making process at a local level, voluntary commitment to a group or association
within the community, etc.
This third dimension of relational capability is ultimately focused on considering
every other person as an end: such an attitude requires the special care one might have
for an individual—through friendship and love—to be extended to any interpersonal
relation, either directly or via mediation by institutions. This is what Paul Ricœur calls
the logic of overabundance, concerning the implementation of the biblical Golden Rule
in social networks (Ricœur, 1990). The negative definition of the Golden Rule (“do not
do to others what you would not want them to do to you”) is close to a minimal and
negative ethical principle (“do no harm”), and expresses a logic of equivalence. But the
Golden Rule in its positive side (“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”)
has a broader meaning: it is an invitation to actively contribute to the good of others,
without any reciprocity. It opens the door to an excess: give according to your capacity,
without expecting an equivalent gift in return. This attitude clearly involves face-to-face
encounters (cf. second component: private relations) but it may also be incorporated
into social, economic and political institutions: it enables respect for the uniqueness of
every person, and expresses the objective of a social organization serving the dignity of
each of its members.
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We can measure this dimension by referring to the level of gifts given or received,
the time and energy freely given to community projects, and the level of trust towards
unknown others.
Dimension Components Deprived if
Integration to network Employment status No stable job with regular professional relations
Access to transport No means of transport
Access to telecommunications Uses a phone, a computer or the Internet
less than once a week
Access to information Gets news from radio, television or newspaper
less than once a week
Private relations Number of people in the household Lives alone
Family ties No trust in relatives
Close friends, emotional support No close friends providing psychological and
emotional support
Financial support No financial support from relatives or acquaintances
Trust in the community No trust in people the individual knows
Civic commitment Membership No active membership in a group
(religious, trade-unions and/or business association)
Collective action No participation in political actions
(meetings, petitions, boycotts, demonstrations)
Vote Does not vote
Solidarity No active membership in a common-interest group
Trust in others No trust in unknown people
Table 2: Relational Capability Index: Dimensions and components
3.3 Cutoffs and weights
3.3.1 Cutoffs for each component and for dimensions
We define three sets of poverty lines, and implement different cutoffs to test the
robustness of our results with respect to threshold variations.
• First, we define poverty lines at the component level. Our choices of dimensions
and deprivation cutoffs (or poverty lines) are defined in Table 2.
• Second, we define a poverty line within each dimension. Someone who is deprived
in at least one component of Dimension 1 (respectively 2 and 3) is poor in this
dimension.
• Third, we define a deprivation cutoff for the index.
In the empirical applications presented in this paper, we use binary values for com-
ponents: let ci,j denote component j in dimension k for individual i, i = 1, ..., N ,
j = 1, ..., Ck, where Ck is the total number of components in dimension k, we set ci,j = 0 if
i is deprived in component j and ci,j = 1 otherwise. We choose the most restrictive dimen-
sional poverty lines: people are deprived in a dimension if and only if they are deprived
in at least one component of this dimension, i.e. xi,k = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Ck}, ci,j = 1
16
We then define the poverty line of the index as the existence of a deprivation in at least
one dimension: ∃k ∈ {1, ...,K}, xi,k < 1. This choice is in line with our Walzerian
perspective, since each of our dimensions represents a specific sphere of life and we con-
sider that someone who reaches the greatest score in terms of capabilities in at least one
sphere should not be considered as deprived, whatever their score in the other spheres.
Nonetheless, we aim to test other sets of cutoffs in future work, at both the dimension
and index levels.
3.3.2 Choosing weights
Weights represent the importance given to:
• one set of capabilities compared to others (weights between dimensions);
• one component compared to another within dimensions;
• part of the population (e.g. the most deprived) compared to another (weights
distributed among people).
First, for each step of the computation, we choose normative weights, defending an
agnostic point of view (see section 4 below). All the components within dimensions are
equally weighted in an index computation. Hence, for xi,k a dimension of poverty for
individual i, k = 1, ...K, xi,k is computed from components ci,j , j = 1, ..., Ck, as follows :
xi,k =
1
Ck
×
Ck∑
j=1
ci,j (1)
Then, followingWalzer (1983), the individual index is computed withmaximin ground-
ings. (1− xi,k) measures the deprivation in dimension k for individual i. A geometrical
mean of (1− xi,k) makes it possible to stress the complementarity relationship between
deprivations: increasing the score of one dimension is sufficient for global improvement.
The different versions of the RCI we present in section 5 are based on geometrical
means of (1− xi,k) on i and k. They are specific elements of the family of indexes that
we present in section 4, associated with three different families of weights. Future work
should include more advanced empirical applications of the axiomatic viewpoint, with
the intension of testing other families of weights.
3.4 Comparisons with existing indicators
3.4.1 Socio-economic indicators
Many development indexes and sets of indicators aim to measure living standards
(income; material deprivation (see Bossert et al. (2009)); access to infrastructures), as well
as access to education, health and social services as factors of social development. These
multidimensional measures of material inequalities and exclusion have been developed in
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response to criticisms of the measurement of living standards based on monetary incomes.
They appear to be particularly relevant in developing countries, where monetary incomes
are often marginal.
Because they focus on material deprivation and access to public services, these di-
mensions reflect direct responsibilities of governments, and can be directly improved by
appropriate public policies. By identifying the level of deprivation of the poorest (Rawls,
1971), they definitively stress major issues of social cohesion and social development.
From our perspective, these indicators are complementary with the RCI view: pro-
grams or policies should simultaneously foster the improvement of living standards and
the development of social relationships in communities, and in the whole of society. The
most universal of these indicators is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire and
Santos, 2010; UNDP, 2010). Table 3 presents the dimensions and cutoffs on which this
is based.
Dimension Indicator Weight Deprived if
Education Years of 1/6 No household member has completed 5 years of schooling
school attendance 1/6 Any school-aged child is not attending school in years 1 to 8
Health Child mortality 1/6 Any child has died in the family
Nutrition 1/6 Any adult or child for whom there is nutritional
information is mal nourished
Living Electricity 1/18 The household has no electricity
standards Drinking water 1/18 The household’s sanitation facility is not improved (according to
MDG guidelines) or is improved but is shared with other households
Sanitation 1/18 The household does not have access to clean drinking water (MDG)
or clean water is more than 30’ walking from home
Flooring 1/18 The household has dirt, sand or dung floor
Cooking fuel 1/18 The household cooks with dung, wood or charcoal
Asset ownership 1/18 The household does not own more than one of the following: radio, TV,
telephone, bike, motorbike or refrigerator, and does not own
a car or truck
Table 3: The Multidimensional Poverty Index
3.4.2 Indicators of social cohesion and exclusion
Various international institutions have integrated the social cohesion into their strat-
egy, and also their monitoring device. They have built a range of statistical indicators
to reiterate the complexity of social cohesion.
The Social Cohesion Indicator (Leaken Indicators, {Eurostat} (2003)) initiated the
institutional research on social cohesion indicators (Atkinson et al., 2002; Marlier, 2007).
We focus here on the four composite indexes that are closest to our perspective, in order
to stress the specificity of the RCI. Table 4 provides a synthetic outlook on the dimensions
and components used by each one.
• The indicator of social exclusion (Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 2006) combines
socio-economic dimensions and private relations, whereas our index does not entail
information on economic poverty or basic needs.
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• The Social Health Indicator (Jany-Catrice, 2009) tries to capture both poverty and
inequality and the level of people’s social integration. Our index does not provide
data on economic inequality.
• The Multidimensional Social Exclusion Index (UNDP Europe & CIS, 2011) aims
to capture all kinds of exclusion: economic, social services, and exclusion from
participation in civil and social life and networks. Our RCI focuses on this last
form of exclusion. It entails a number of variables that are related to material
conditions, but these are not considered to impede the quality of relations among
people; nor are they considered in terms of basic needs (either economic or social).
• The Better Life Index (OECD 2012) entails two chapters that are close to our RCI:
social networks and civic commitment and governance. The three dimensions re-
lated to “social networks” are personal relations (close to our second component:
private relations), relations with collectivity (close to our second component: civic
commitment), and norms and values (captured through the level of trust, which is
close to our third dimension). The “civic commitment and governance” chapter en-
tails three dimensions: the first, “civic commitment,” is close to our own, including
voting and political participation (for us: collective action and membership). The
second and third dimensions, “quality of governance” and “trust in political institu-
tions,” are not captured by our index. We focus on more immediate relationships
between citizens and society.
To summarize, our index is the only one to focus on personal, social and political
bonds, without providing data on economic exclusion. As mentioned above, it enables
the levels of social ties and relational deprivations to be compared in different contexts,
independently of the economic wealth issues that are captured by other indexes such as
the MPI. We aim to study such comparisons in forthcoming work.
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4 The axiomatic: building coherent poverty indexes
4.1 Building the Relational Poverty Index
As acknowledged by Villar (2010), “Defining a poverty measure in a truly multidimen-
sional context involves a number of subtle and difficult issues: choosing the appropriate
poverty dimensions beyond income or wealth, deciding on whether they all are equally
important, fixing sensible thresholds in those dimensions and setting criteria to identify
as poor those individuals whose achievements lie partially below them, defining an overall
measure of poverty intensity, etc. Those difficulties anticipate that many compromises
are required and, indirectly, that the axiomatic approach may be the best way to deal
with this type of problem as it makes explicit all those compromises.” 5 Here, we provide
an axiomatization for a family of Multidimensional Poverty Indexes. In the next section,
we will present how to use specific elements of this family with real-world data.
Each index can be characterized as lying somewhere between the two extreme points
of our family of indexes: the geometric mean (Villar, 2010) and the Rawlsian Maximin
(Rawls, 1971). Although both social choice correspondences have been thoroughly stud-
ied from the social choice theoretical viewpoint,6 we are not aware of any attempt to link
these two major concepts of justice with the concerns involved in the literature devoted
to poverty measurement. This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap.
We suggest that the geometric mean can be interpreted as a (hyperbolic) version
of the “utilitarian” viewpoint. With this interpretation in mind, our family of indexes
builds a bridge between celebrated theories of justice and poverty measurements. An
alternative standpoint enables us to characterize each one of our indexes as being the
supremum of the weighted geometric averages, with the sup being taken over some col-
lection of weights of dimensions and people. When the collection of weights reduces to
the uniform vector, we are back to the standard geometric mean (this is the “utilitarian”
solution). When the underlying collection of weights includes the whole unit simplex over
dimensions and people, then we get the Maximin solution. One possible interpretation
is as follows: suppose that the economist who is in charge of measuring poverty in a
given population reflects as if she were in Rawls’s original position. Beyond the veil of
ignorance, the point that is ignored is related to which role one will endorse (as in the
standard, political interpretation of Rawls’s theory of justice), but in which dimension
one will get some talent (or some endowment, or some “social capital”). Thus, uncer-
tainty bears on dimensions, rather than on persons. In addition, from the viewpoint of
the economist standing beyond the veil, there might be some ambiguity concerning the
probability according to which talents and deprivations will be distributed. As a result,
if the economist has no prejudice about the distribution of talents and deprivations, they
might opt for the Maximin solution as a way to measure multidimensional poverty. If,
on the other hand, the economist has good reasons to believe that the distribution will
5See Dardadoni (1995), Ravallion (1996), Tsui (1996), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), Lugo
and Maasoumi (2008), Alkire and Foster (2008), Wagle (2008), and Chakravarty (2009).
6See Dhillon and J.-F. Mertens (1999) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2008) to name but a few path-
breaking papers in this area.
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be uniform, they may choose the “utilitarian” solution (i.e., in our context, the geometric
average). Otherwise, she might choose an index in our family which lies somewhere be-
tween the first two. If desired, it is also possible to include ambiguity about the persons
(and not only dimensions) in the non-symmetric version of our family of indexes.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the fist attempt to formally fill the gap between
theories of justice and poverty measurements. As we take inspiration from Artzner et al.
(1999) (where an additive version of a similar axiomatization was introduced in order
to measure the risk position of a portfolio), we call coherent a multidimensional poverty
index belonging to our family. We finally show that such indexes satisfy the following
properties, which are considered as desirable by the literature:7
(i) Each index is continuous: slight changes in the achievements of certain persons
only induce slight changes in the poverty measurement;
(ii) Each index is ordinal, in the sense that it does not depend upon the choice
of the specific units in which dimensions of achievements are measured. This property
deserves some comment. In Alkire and Foster (2008), it is argued that data describing
capabilities and functionings, in the spirit of Sen’s Multidimensional Human Index, are
ordinal in nature. They therefore may lack a basis for comparisons across dimensions.
This, of course, is a challenge for Multidimensional Poverty measurement. In the above-
quoted paper, indeed, only one kind of measure is shown to be ordinal in that sense
(the M0 measure in their parlance) while the others are not. At the same time, this
ordinal measure fails to satisfy a number of other properties. In particular, it cannot
capture the intensity of poverty—a failure that can be viewed as arising from its being
a piecewise constant (and hence discontinuous) measure. Here, we prove that coherent
poverty measures are ordinal in the following sense: If one multiplies any dimension
by λ > 0 (both for achievements and for the poverty cut-off), then the “poor” set is
unaffected, while the index, P , is simply multiplied by λ. As a consequence, a normalized
version of the index, P/||P ||, is independent of such changes in the dimension unit used.
Since, on the other hand, P is continuous, this is the first example (to the best of our
knowledge) of a continuous and ordinal Multidimensional Poverty measure.
(iii) It yields a criterion for “relative poverty” that depends upon the whole
population under scrutiny;
(iv) The marginal rate of substitution among subjects or among dimen-
sions is decreasing. The reduction in the deprivation8 of dimension k for poor individ-
ual i required to compensate an increase in the deprivation of dimension k for individual
h is larger, the higher the initial level of deprivation in i.
(v) As in Villar (2010), it is multiplicatively decomposable by population
subgroups (but it does not satisfy Subgroup Decomposability in the additive form
given in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003)). This property says the following: if the
population is partitioned into subgroups, the overall poverty index corresponds to the
7See, e.g., Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) and Alkire and Foster (2008).
8Recall that a person is said to be deprived in one dimension whenever their achievement falls below
the cut-off or dimension-specific poverty line.
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weighted average of subgroup poverty values, where the weights correspond to population
shares.
(vi) In certain circumstances, we may have additional information that
allows us to regard certain dimensions and/or certain subgroups of the population as
meriting a greater relative weight than others. Each index can be adjusted so as to
capture this kind of requirement. Of course, if desired, it can as well be made symmetrical
among persons.
(vii) It verifies the transfer principle (Villar, 2010): a reduction of size δ > 0
in the deprivation with respect to dimension k of a poor person i who is worse off in this
dimension than another poor person, j, more than compensates for an increase of the
same size, δ, in the deprivation of j, provided their relative positions remain unaltered.
(viii) Principle of population: a replica of the population does not change the
poverty measure.
The subsequent section is organized as follows. The next subsection provides the
model and makes the link between the “utilitarian” standpoint and the geometric mean
explicit. Subsection 5.3 deals with the axiomatization of coherent multidimensional
poverty indexes. The last subsection provides the main properties of this family of
indexes.
4.2 The model
LetN = {1, ..., N} denote a society consisting ofN individuals and letK = {1, ...,K}
be a set of dimensions.
A social state is a matrix, y =
(
yij
)
ij
∈ MN×K(R++), with N rows, one for each
individual, and K columns, one for each dimension. The entry yij ∈ R++ describes
the value of variable j for individual i. Since we are going to deal with ordinal poverty
measures, there is little loss of generality in imposing, from the outset, that all variables be
strictly positive.9 A vector z ∈ RK++ of reference values describes the poverty thresholds
for all dimensions. How these thresholds are fixed is definitely an important issue, but
we leave it aside here and take z ∈ RKN++ as a given. Those reference values may have
been fixed externally (absolute poverty lines), or may depend on the data of the social
state matrix itself (relative poverty lines, such as a fraction of the median or the mean
value). The units in which achievements are measured are chosen so that z >> 1 :=
(1, ..., 1) ∈ RKN++ .10 When all individuals are attributed the same cut-offs, z = (z, ..., z),
for some reference vector z ∈ RK++. In this case, if xi ≤ z, then individual i can be said
to be poor (with the converse being false).
We denote by Np(y; z) ⊂ N the set of poor that results from a social state matrix y
and a vector, z, of reference values. The number of poor people is np(y; z) := |Np(y; z)|.
9We cannot claim that this entails no loss of generality at all. Indeed, if some achievement is “nat-
urally” given as being (strictly) positive, then, whether it is scored ε > 0 or λε > 0 does not matter.
However, if the original achievement was 0, then, replacing it by ε > 0 might have an effect on the
poverty measure. The same problem arises in, for instance, Seth (2009).
10Given two vectors x, y, x << y if the strict inequality holds coordinatewise.
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As we shall see, Np(y; z) (hence np(y; z)) will be determined endogenously by our multi-
dimensional poverty index).
4.2.1 The utilitarian index
A poverty index is a map of P : RKN++ → R+. We begin with three axioms that
unambiguously characterize the “utilitarian” poverty index.
The first one, anonymity, says that all agents and all dimensions are equally impor-
tant:
Anonymity. Let x ∈ RKN++ , and let pi ∈ SKN denote a permutation over its
components {1, ...,KN}. Then, P (s) = P (pi(s)).
The second Axiom implies that P reduces to the identity mapping on the diagonal
of RKN+ :
Normalization. Let s ∈ RKN++ be such that sij = a ∀i, j. Then P (s) = a.
The last property requires that the difference between the new and the initial values
of P , when subject i’s achievement relative to dimension j changes from sij to tij , be a
monotone function of the difference between sij and tij .
Difference Monotonicity. Let s, t ∈ RKN+ be such that shq = thq ∀(h, q) 6= (i, j).
Then
P (s)− P (t) = gij(sij − tij),
for some increasing function gij : R+ → R. Since gij(0) = 0, it follows that
gij(x) ≥ 0 if, and only if, x ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. An index P (·) satisfies anonymity, normalization and difference mono-
tonicity if, and only if, it takes the form
P (s) =
1
KN
∑
i∈N,j∈K
sij .
This index corresponds to the familiar arithmetic average, and we denote it PU .
Proof. Let s ∈ RKN+ . By difference monotonicity and normalization,
P (s11, 0, ..., 0)− P (0, ..., 0) = g11(s11)
P (s11, s12, ..., 0)− P (s11, 0, ..., 0) = g12(s12)
so that
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P (s) = P (0) +
∑
i,j
gij(sij).
By anonymity, gij(·) = g(·) ∀i, j. The normalization axiom yields: P (0, ..., 0) = 0.
Moreover,
P (a, ..., a) = KNg(a) = a.
Therefore, g(a) = aKN . The conclusion follows.
4.2.2 The geometric average
The link between the (admittedly fairly classical) index, PU , and the geometric
average is given by the following transformation:
Consider the following poverty index, G(·), defined by RKN++ :
G(x) :=
[∏
k,h
xk,h
] 1
kn
.
Given a vector, x ∈ RKN++ , let us denote by lnx the vector whose coordinates are
lnxk,h, every h, k. Obviously,
G(x) = expU(lnx). (2)
From this very simple computation, one can deduce the axiomatization provided by
Villar (2010) that fully characterizes the geometric average as a poverty index. Indeed,
it follows from (2) that G must verify the anonymity and normalization axioms together
with the following ratio monotonicity:
Ratio Monotonicity Let s, t ∈ RKN++ be such that shq = thq ∀(h, q) 6= (i, j).
Then,
G(s)
G(t)
= gij
(sij
tij
)
,
for some increasing function gij : R++ → R. Since gij(1) = 1, it follows that
gij(x) ≥ 1 if, and only if, x ≥ 1.
In other words, the geometric (or Cobb-Douglas) average may be viewed as the out-
come of the utilitarian rule after the transformation given by (2). In the following section,
we show that G(·) is but one extremal point of a whole family of Poverty indexes that
can be constructed in quite a similar way. The other extremal index of this family turns
out to be the Maximin rule.
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4.3 Coherent poverty indexes
In order to define a coherent poverty index, we impose some axioms on the mapping
P (·). For this purpose, we define a poverty exit set, E ⊂ RKN++ . A population belongs to
E whenever it is not poor.
4.3.1 Axioms for E
In order to build an ordinal index (i.e. an index that does not depend upon the choice
of unities in which dimensions are measured), we consider only normalized achievements.
That is, if x ∈ RKN++ is a given achievement, we shall deal with x := (xhk/zhk)h,k.
Axiom 1. 1+ RKN+ ⊂ E .
Consider, now, a population such that all its individuals have achievements (before
normalization) that are all strictly below the thresholds given by z. Obviously, such a
population should be considered poor. This is the content of the next axiom.11
Axiom 2. E ∩
(
1+ RKN−
)
= {1}.
For every x, y ∈ RKN++ , let xy denote the vector in RKN++ whose coordinates are
xk,hzk,h. Consequently, 1/y denotes the (unique) vector such that y1/y = 1, while
xλ is the vector with coordinates xλk,h. The “box” product, ··, is to be interpreted as
formalizing a change in the achievements of the population under scrutiny. For instance,
x1 = x stands for “no change”. In contrast, x0 = 0 represents a radical depletion of
the population, etc. For an arbitrary vector, y ∈ RKN++ , xy will represent a change that
may be dimension- and individual-dependent.
A set F ⊂ RKN++ is multiplicatively convex whenever, as soon as x, y ∈ F , it results in
xαy1−α ∈ F ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
Axiom 3. The poverty exit set, E , is multiplicatively convex.
Axiom 1 says that, if all the individuals of a population exhibit all their achievements
above the threshold (i.e., if x ≥ 1), this population is not poor. Conversely, if x << 1,
Axiom 2 implies that the population is poor. Ambiguity remains only whenever some
individuals exhibit some achievements above the threshold, and others do not. Our last
axiom deals with such ambiguous cases. Suppose that a population, x, is not poor. Take
λ > 0 and consider the auxiliary population given by xλ. Axiom 4 says that this new
population should not be considered as poor either. Clearly, if x1/z ≥ 1 (respectively
x1/z < 1), then (xλ1/z) ≥ 1 (respectively < 1), so that the auxiliary population
turns out, indeed, not to be poor (respectively to be poor). What the next axiom says
11Actually, Axiom 2 says a little bit more, since it implies that, in the case of a single-person population,
this person will be poor if none of their achievements end up strictly above the cut-off, and at least
one of their achievements stay strictly below this cut-off. We could replace Axiom 2 with the weaker
E ∩
“
1+RKN−−
”
= ∅. But our other axioms would nevertheless strengthen it into Axiom 2 in most cases
of interest for practical purposes.
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is that this property should not hold only for the extreme cases envisaged by Axioms 1
and 2, but also for the “ambiguous” cases.
A set F ⊂ RKN++ is a multiplicative cone whenever, as soon as x ∈ F , it results in
xλ ∈ F for any λ ≥ 0.
Axiom 4. The poverty exit set, E , is a multiplicative cone.
Examples The two following sets verify all four axioms.
a) The “utilitarian case.” Consider
E := {x ∈ RKN++ | G(x) ≥ G(1)}.
E is the upper-set of the hyperbola {x : G(x) = λ}, and is closed and (additively)
convex.
b) The “Rawlsian case.” Consider
E := {x ≥ 1},
E is an affine closed, convex (additive) cone.
Although it is not necessary for the core of our theory, the next axiom will prove
useful.
Axiom 5. E verifies the following Anonymity property: Let x = (x1, .., xn) ∈ RKN++
and σ(x) = (xσ(1), ..., xσ(N)) ∈ RKN++ the vector obtained after having swapped its indi-
viduals with the permutation σ ∈ SN . Then,
x ∈ E ⇐⇒ σ(x) ∈ E ∀σ ∈ SN .
4.3.2 Axioms for P
Given a set E , the poverty index, PE , is defined as a measure of the minimal additional
“achievements” that have to be added to a given distribution so that the population can be
considered as non-poor; i.e., so that the resulting distribution belongs to E . Obviously, PE
will heavily depend upon the choice of E . This is why the axiom studied here only defines
a family of poverty indexes, with each index being identified through its corresponding
poverty exit set.
Given E , the mapping PE(·) is defined as:
PE(x) := inf
{
τ ∈ R | xzτ ∈ E}. (3)
Axiom 1 implies PE(1) = 0, and limx→0 P (x) = +∞. Conversely, given a poverty
exit index, P (·), one can define the poverty exit set, EP , as
EP :=
{
x ∈ RKN++ | P (x) ≤ 0
}
. (4)
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We now state several properties for P . As we shall see, these can be deduced from
Axioms 1-4 on E via (3). Conversely, Axioms 1-4 can be deduced from the following
properties of P , via (4).
Axiom HI (Homothetic invariance) ∀x ∈ RKN++ , α ∈ R, P (xzα) = P (x)− α.
An easy consequence of Axiom HI is that P (xzP (x)) = 0—which is consistent with the
interpretation of P (·) given by (3). It follows that
∀x, xzP (x) ∈ E . (5)
Axiom S (Sub-multiplicativity) ∀x,y, P (xy) ≤ P (x) + P (y).
Axiom S can be interpreted as saying that averaging (in the multiplicative sense) two
populations does not magnify the extent of poverty (i.e. the share of the poor within
the global population), nor its intensity (i.e. the individual deprivation suffered from
each individual), above the sum of the indexes of the subpopulations. Since x and y
are vectors of the same dimension, they correspond to populations of the same size.
Hence, this axiom is a weak version of the subgroup additive decomposability applied to
populations of equal size.
Axiom PH (Positive Homogeneity) : ∀x ∈ RKN++ ,∀λ ≥ 0, P (xλ) ≤ λP (x).
Axiom S implies that P (xn) ≤ nP (x) for every x and every integer n. Axiom PH extends
this property to any non-negative number.
Axiom M (Monotonicity): P (x) ≤ P (y) ∀y ≤ x.
The aim of the last axiom is to avoid trivial constant indexes.
By analogy with Artzner et al. (1999), a poverty index that satisfies Axioms HI, S,
PH, M and NT is said to be coherent.
Similarly to the anonymity axiom for E , the next one is not needed for the charac-
terization of coherent poverty measures, but will prove useful.
Axiom A (Anonymity): Let x = (x1, ..,xn) ∈ RKN++ and σ(x) = (xσ(1), ...,xσ(n)) ∈
RKN++ the vector obtained after having permuted its individual components through the
permutation σ ∈ Sn. Then, P (x) = P (σ(x)).
Proposition 2. (i) If a poverty index, P (·), is coherent, then its poverty exit set, EP ,
defined by 4, verifies Axioms 1-4 and is closed. Moreover, P (·) = PEP (·).
(ii) Conversely, if a set, F , satisfies Axioms 1-4, then PF is coherent, and
EPF = F .12
(iii) E verifies the Anonymity axiom if, and only if, P does.
12 F is the topological closure of F .
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Proof. (i) 1) PE(1) = 0 and Monotonicity imply that E verifies Axiom 1.
2) If x << 1, Monotonicity implies PE(x) ≥ 0. However, we can find α > 0 such that
xzα << 0, so that PE(xzα) ≥ 0. HI then implies that α ≤ 0, which is a contradiction.
Thus, EP verifies Axiom 2.
3) Axioms S and PH imply that EP is multiplicatively convex.
4) If x ∈ EP , this yields: P (xλ) ≤ λP (x) ≤ 0 for all λ ≥ 1. Consequently, EP is a
multiplicative cone.
5) Axioms PH and S imply that the function x 3 RKN++ 7→ P (exp(x)) is convex, and
hence continuous. Consequently, x 7→ P (x) itself must be continuous, so that EP is
closed.
(ii) 0) Axioms 2 and 3 ensure that PF is well-defined.
1) inf{τ ∈ R | xzτ+α ∈ E} = inf{τ ∈ R | xzτ ∈ E} − α, which proves HI.
2) Suppose that xzλ and yzβ both belong to E . Axiom 3 implies that (xzλ) 1α
and
(
yzβ
) 1
1−α also belong to E for every α ∈ [0, 1). Axiom 2 then implies that(
xy
)
zα+β =
(
xzλ
)

(
yzβ
) ∈ E . This proves the multiplicative convexity.
3) Suppose x ≤ y and xzλ ∈ E . Then, yzλ ≥ xzλ, so that, by Axiom 1,
yzλ ∈ E . The monotonicity of P follows.
4) If m ≥ PE(x), then, xzm ∈ E , hence, ∀λ > 0, xλzλm =
(
xzm
)λ ∈ E .
Therefore, PE(xλ) ≤ λm.
5) ∀x ∈ F , P (x) ≤ 0. Thus, F ⊂ EPF .
4.4 Properties of coherent multidimensional poverty measures
4.4.1 A representation theorem and ordinality
We now provide a full characterization of the whole family of coherent poverty exit
indexes. For this purpose, let us define a weighted geometric average. Given any vector
in the unit simplex, pi ∈ ∆KN+ := {p ∈ RKN+ |
∑
k,h pk,h = 1}, the pi-geometric average,
Gpi(·), is defined by:
Gpi(x) :=
∏
k,h
x
pik,h
kh .
Proposition 3. The index P is coherent if, and only if, there exists a family, P ⊂ ∆KN+ ,
of weight vectors, such that
P (x) = − inf
{ ln(Gpi(x))
ln
(
Gpi(z)
) | pi ∈ P}.
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Proof. The “if” part is immediate. The “only if” part can be deduced from Proposition
2.1 in Huber (1981), and can be stated as a consequence of the bipolar theorem in linear
duality theory. Consider the set
C := {x ∈ RKN | xhk = ln(yhk) for some y ∈ E}.
It follows from Axioms 3 and 4, together with the closedness of E , that C is a convex
and closed cone in RKN . Thus, its polar cone
C◦ := {α ∈ RKN+ |
∑
hk
αhkxhk ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ C}
is also a convex and closed cone in RKN+ . The bipolar theorem implies that
C = {x ∈ RKN |
∑
h,k
pihkxhk ≥ 0 ∀pi ∈ P},
where P := ∆KN+ ∩C◦.We deduce from (5) that lnx+P (x) ln z ∈ C, for every x ∈ RKN++ .
Thus, ∀pi ∈ P, ∑h,k pihk(lnxhk + P (x) ln zhk) ≥ 0. Therefore,
P (x)
∑
h,k
pih,k ln zhk ≥ −
∑
h,k
pihk lnxhk ∀pi ∈ P.
Hence,
P (x) ≥ sup
pi
−
ln
(∏
hk x
pihk
hk
)
ln
(∏
hk z
pihk
hk
) = − inf{ ln(Gpi(x))
ln
(
Gpi(z)
) | pi ∈ P}.
Conversely, we deduce from Axiom 2 that lnx+P (x) ln z+ln ε /∈ C for every x ∈ RKN++
and every 0<<ε<<1. Therefore, ∀pi ∈ P, ∑h,k pihk(lnxhk + P (x) ln zhk + ln ε) < 0. It
follows that
P (xε) < − inf
{ ln(Gpi(x))
ln
(
Gpi(z)
) | pi ∈ P}.
The equality follows by continuity of P (·).
Examples
a) The “utilitarian case” corresponds to P = {((1/KN, ..., 1/KN)}.
b) The “Rawlsian” case corresponds to P = ∆KN+ .
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the typical geometry of E .
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Fig 1. A piecewise smooth poverty exit set
Observe that, in general, the frontier of the set E need not be smooth, as there is
typically a kink at 1. The “utilitarian” case corresponds to the situation where the two
branches of hyperbola coincide with the hypercurve:
∏
h,k xh,k = constant. This is a
unique case where the boundary of E is a smooth submanifold. The larger the set P, the
smaller the subset E . Finally, the Rawlsian case corresponds with the situation where E
coincides with the affine non-negative orthant:
E = 1+ RKN+ .
Notice that weights in P can differ across both individuals and dimensions. When
P (or, equivalently, E) verifies anonymity, the set of weights, P, reduces to weights over
dimensions. The weighted geometric average now becomes:
Gpˆi(x) :=
∏
k,h
x
pˆik
N
kh ∀pˆi ∈ Pˆ ⊂ ∆K+ .
Corollary 1. The index P is coherent and anonymous if, and only if, there exists a
family, Pˆ ⊂ ∆K+ , of weights over dimensions such that
P (x) = − inf
{ ln(Gpi(x))
ln
(
Gpi(z)
) | pi ∈ Pˆ}.
Thanks to Theorem 3, whether it is anonymous or not, a coherent index P can also
easily be shown to be ordinal in the following sense.
Ordinality. A measure, Q, is said to be ordinal if the following holds. Given some
N × K-matrix Λ = (λjj) ∈ MN×K×K(R++), and given also a social status matrix
y ∈ MN×K(R++), and a cut-off vector, z ∈ RKN++ , there exists some λ ∈ R which
depends only upon Λ, such that:
Q(y; z) + λ = Q(yΛ; z ? Λ),
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where yΛ is the N×K-matrix with entry (yλ)ij := yijΛij , and z?Λ is the NK-vector
with entry (z ? Λ)nk := znkΛnk.
An example will easily illustrate how this abstract property solves several problems
related to ordinal data. Consider the question: “Which kind of toilet facility does your
household have?”, together with three possible answers:
a. “Open defacation field.”
b. “Shared flush.”
c. “Private flush.”
Of course, the metric between each one of these answers does not have any sensible
meaning. To circumvent this issue, it suffices to capture this question through two
dimensions, each of which accept two answers, {a, b} and {a, c}, which are captured by
two variables {α, β} ⊂ R and {α, γ} ⊂ R, respectively, with α < β < γ. Ordinality then
ensures that the choice of (α, β, γ) does not matter.
Going back to coherent poverty measures, it is straightforward for any x ∈ RKN++ and
any Λ as above, xΛ/zΛ = x/z. Thus, as we only deal with normalized achievements,
any Multidimensional Poverty Index is ordinal.
4.4.2 Who is poor?
In this subsection, we confine ourselves to the subfamily of anonymous coherent poverty
indexes. Consequently, P is associated with a set, P ⊂ ∆k+, of K-dimensional vector of
weights, pi = (pik)k—one for each dimension—belonging to the unit simplex.
We now provide an answer to the question “who is poor?”. Regarding this issue, two
kinds of approach have been explored in the literature.13 The “union” approach regards
a person who is deprived in one dimension as being poor at the multidimensional level.
This is usually acknowledged to be overly inclusive and leads to exaggerate estimates
of poverty. In contrast, the “intersection” approach requires a person to be deprived in
all dimensions before being considered poor. This is often considered too constricting,
and may lead to untenably low estimates of poverty. We now show that the natural
definition of a poor person that follows from our approach leads to an endogenous de-
termination that is always strictly less inclusive than the “union” approach and weakly
more inclusive than the “intersection” approach. Therefore, it lies somewhere between
these two extremes, and in fact, it turns out that only the Rawlsian case coincides with
the “intersection” viewpoint.
Two examples will help to identify how the determination of poor persons occurs in
our setting. Consider the case where N = 1; i.e., the population consists of a single
person. Then, clearly, this single person, i, will be poor whenever the population is
so; i.e., when P (xi) < 0. Next, suppose that the population is made of n identical
people. Again, each person will be poor if the population is so; i.e., if, and only if,∏
k x
pik
i <
∏
k z
pik
i for every pi ∈ P.14
13See, e.g., Alkire and Foster (2008) and Villar (2010).
14Notice that, here, x is not normalized.
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It is this latter condition that we adopt as a definition. Indeed, a simple continuity
argument explains why no other choice can be made. Take 0<<ε<<1; one has xε poor
and Gpi(x) < 1 for any pi. However, limε→1Gpi(x) = 1−. Thus, no population such that
Gpi(x) < 1 can be considered as non-poor.
Definition 1. Given a coherent poverty index, P , associated with a set of weights, P ⊂
∆KN+ , a person, i, is poor whenever∏
k
xpiki,k <
∏
k
zpikk ∀pi ∈ P
or, equivalently, when
sup
pi∈P
Gpi(xi) < 1.
In the “utilitarian” case (where P reduces to the uniform singleton), this definition
coincides with the one introduced by Villar (2010).
As an illustration, let us consider a society according to two dimensions. The poor
are all individuals who fall strictly below the two branches of hyperbola:
q
A
B
C
D
Dimension k
Dimension j
E
1
Fig 2. Who is poor?
The set E is always larger than the one defined by the intersection approach, and is
always contained in the one provided by the union approach. The Rawlsian case, here,
coincides with the intersection approach.
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5 Empirical applications
To compute the RCI from the Nigerian and Afrobarometer databases, we used the
questions and cutoffs presented in Tables 5 and 10, respectively. We computed each di-
mensional index using arithmetic means on the components, following equation 1. Then,
we computed three versions of the RCI, each one of which was a specific element of the
family of indexes characterized in the previous section.
The specificity of our data led us to adapt the axiomatic developed supra. Indeed,
with the choice of metrics we made at the components level (ci,j ∈ {0, 1}, see 3.3.1), two
of our hypotheses on dimensions could be violated: the assumption that all variables be
strictly positive and the assumption that all thresholds be strictly superior to 1 (see 4.2),
so we could have faced the risk of computing the log of 0 and/or dividing by 0.
Moreover, in order to follow Walzer’s approach (Walzer, 1983), we wanted to imple-
ment a particular version of the geometric mean, namely G(x) = 1 −∏i,k(1 − xik)piik .
This specification, combined with our choices of cutoffs, implies that the mere existence
of a non-deprived individual in one dimension yields a geometric mean equal to 1, which
is quite problematic from a comparative perspective.
The next subsection deals with the choices we made to overcome these two issues,
and presents the three specific indexes we used in our empirical work. We then present
the results of our estimations in the Niger Delta, Nigeria; and on the Afrobarometer
databases.
5.1 Characterization of our empirical indexes
5.1.1 Methodological choices
Given our metrics, and the particular kind of indexes we want to compute, we
define the endogenous set of poor as the subset of people who have a score
strictly inferior to 1 in all dimensions—or, more precisely, the dimensions pondered
by a positive weight for at least one probability measure pi ∈ P. 15 This is consistent
with Proposition 3 of the previous section. Obviously, this means that, while being
continuous with respect to achievements, our multidimensional measure is not continuous
with respect to (any topology on the space of) probability measures in the unit simplex
∆K := {pi ∈ RK+ |
∑
k pi
k = 1}. Moreover, a person who has a score of 1 in at least one
dimension associated with a strictly positive weight will get the same global score as a
person who has a score of 1 in all dimensions. Since the latter has no deprivation and
hence is clearly non-poor, for continuity reasons, the former should also be considered as
non-poor according to the family of weights we use. This is consistent with the Walzerian
theory of justice underlying our approach: for a person to be non-poor, it “suffices” that
15 In other words, if someone has a score equal to the threshold, 1, in dimension k and a score strictly
inferior to 1 in all the other dimensions, they will be considered as non-deprived if at least one probability
measure, pi, within the family P involved in the definition of P (·) puts a positive weight on dimensionk.
However, the individual will be viewed as deprived if none of the probabilities, pi, under scrutiny has a
non-zero weight associated with dimension k.
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they succeed in being non-deprived in at least one relevant social sphere. Each social
sphere is captured by means of our dimensions. Relevance is measured through the family
of weights, P.
Let Npip denote the number of poor that results from this definition. Since none of
the dimensional weights we are going to consider in the rest of this paper are null, the
set of poor is the same for all our families of weights. Thus, we can identify Npip := Np.
The share of poor people in the population, Np/N , will be used to measure the extent
of poverty.
We then compute our indexes on the subset of poor people. This is coherent
with the axioms, since it corresponds to the case where we apply the following family
of weights: P = (pip, pip¯), where poor people are indexed by p and non-poor by p¯, with
pip¯ = 0. Different kinds of weights (anonymous or “Maximin” in the following examples)
can then be applied within the set of poor as long as the family, pip, verifies itself the
conditions on weight families.
The ratio Np/N , and our family of indexes, measure the extent and the in-
tensity of poverty, respectively.
We can easily get one single index that summarizes the two pieces of in-
formation by multiplying them, following Alkire and Foster (2008). We present
these kinds of measures here, in addition to our separate measures of extent and inten-
sity. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the synthetic indexes obtained via
multiplication are not Coherent Poverty Indexes as defined in the axioms16.
5.1.2 Relational Capability Index and Relational Deprivation Index
Until now, we have only introduced the RCI, which increases with the level of func-
tionings. For comparability reasons, since the main poverty indexes such as the MPI are
presented in the opposite way (i.e. they increase with the level of deprivation), and in or-
der to respect the axiomatic viewpoint, which is also written in terms of deprivations, we
decided to create a second index, which can be calculated from a simple transformation
of the RCI. We called this the “Relational Deprivation Index” (RDI). The next paragraph
explains how the RCI and RDI are computed in the specific case of our Nigerian and
Afrobarometer data, and how to pass from one to the other in each of the specifications.
5.1.3 Our Indexes
Utilitarian indexes We computed three versions of the utilitarian index presented
above—i.e. the index we obtain via uniform weighting of both dimensions and individuals—
16 Indeed, the set of poor itself is not a Coherent Poverty Index since it only consists of counting the
poor; i.e. computing the arithmetic mean of a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is poor, and 0 if they
are not. Multiplying a Coherent Poverty Index with such a measure would yield an index which clearly
has no reason to verify the axioms on Coherent Poverty Indexes.
35
the arithmetic means (RCIa and RDIa), the geometric means (RCIg and RDIg) 17, and
our “utilitarian” coherent capability indexes (RCIu and RDIu), using the following char-
acterizations:
RCIa =
1
3Np
Np∑
i=1
3∑
k=1
xi,k RDIa = 1−RCIa
RCIg = 1−
Np∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)
1
3Np RDIg = 1−RCIg
RCIu = − ln
[
N∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)
1
3Np
]
RDIu = − ln
[
1−
N∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)
1
3Np
]
The construction of our “utilitarian” coherent capability indexes deserves specific
comment. Indeed, they are computed from the log of the geometric indexes. However,
in order to express them in the same way as the arithmetic and geometric means, and
to obtain positive numbers, we use the geometric RCI to compute the utilitarian RDI,
and vice versa: RCIu = − ln(RDIg) and RDIu = − ln(RCIg)18.
Weighted indexes We present two forms of weighted indexes, using the family of
dimensional weights P = ((1/2, 1/4, 1/4), (1/4, 1/2, 1/4), (1/4, 1/4, 1/2)) and the general
formula:
RCIw = −sup
i,pi
ln Np∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)pik,i
 and RDIw = −inf
i,pi
ln(1− Np∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)pik,i)

We also tested two other families of dimensional weights, which we do not present
here since the conclusions remained unchanged19.
Our “Anonymous” indexes (RCId and RDId) consider all individuals as equally im-
portant, which boils down to applying a uniform set of weights (1/Np, ..., 1/Np) for in-
dividuals and only using dimensional weights. On the contrary, our “Rawlsian” indexes
(RCIr and RDIr) use Dirac measures on i in addition to the weights on k. They allow
us to study the evolution of the poorest individuals of our sample, illustrating Rawls’s
definition of the “Maximin” principle.
17Indeed, the arithmetic mean is not a Coherent Poverty Index as defined in this paper. Nonetheless,
we computed it for comparability reasons with other indexes, such as the MPI. The geometric mean is
an intermediate step before computing the final utilitarian index.
18 Our geometric indexes are included in ]0, 1]; hence, taking the log of these indexes yields a negative
number. This is why we take the opposite of the log. But since ln is an increasing function, − ln is
decreasing and we have to switch RCI and RDI to obtain an outcome that reads in the same way as
the geometric mean.
19More precisely, we tested bP = ((2/3, 1/3, 0), (1/3, 2/3, 0), (2/3, 0, 1/3), (1/3, 0, 2/3), (0, 1/3, 2/3),
(0, 2/3, 1/3)) and eP = ((1/2, 1/3, 1/6), (1/2, 1/6, 1/3), (1/3, 1/2, 1/6), (1/3, 1/6, 1/2), (1/6, 1/3, 1/2),
(1/6, 1/2, 1/3)). One should bear in mind, however, that to compute bP we would have to re-define the
set of poor since we set the weight of one dimension to 0, and all people who were non-poor according
to this dimension only should now be considered as poor.
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RCId = −sup
pi∈P
ln Np∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)pik/Np
 RDId = − inf
pi∈P
ln(1− Np∏
i=1
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)pik/Np)

RCIr = − sup
pi∈P
i∈{1,...,Np}
[
ln
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)pik,i
]
RDIr = − inf
pi∈P
i∈{1,...,Np}
[
ln(1−
3∏
k=1
(1− xi,k)pik,i)
]
Our three versions of the RCI (respectively RDI), RCIu, RCId, RCIr (respectively
RDIu, RDId, RDIr), along with the share of non-poor, 1 − Np/N (respectively the
share of poor Np/N), give a first overview of the types of indicators that the axioms can
yield in terms of relational capabilities (respectively deprivations). Multiplying the two
elements allows us to synthetize the information regarding extent and intensity into one
single index.
Indeed, many other elements of the family should be tested; e.g. those that use the
family of weights based on Dirac measures of dimensions. We aim to focus on this in
future work.
5.2 Empirical application: the relational impact of oil extraction in
the Niger Delta
5.2.1 Presentation of the Nigerian project
The research has been carried out by CODEV 20 in Nigeria since 2007 on the societal
commitment of Total in the Niger Delta aims to study, through the “Poverty Exit Index”
(PEI) and the RCI, the impact of the company’s presence for local communities in terms
of material living conditions and social network quality, in a context of corruption, clien-
telism and rising inequalities.
Our PEI is based on the same dimensions as the Multidimensional Poverty Index pre-
sented above (see Table 3): education, health and standards of living. These dimensions
break down into several components (8 in total).
We actually computed two versions of this index. The first, PEI1, was inspired by
Muhammad Yunus’s suggestion to assess the poverty exit situation for those who have
utilized microcredit programs. PE1 uses uniform weighting: each component is weighted
by 1/8, regardless of the number of components in its dimension. As a second attempt,
following the creation of the MPI by UNDP and OPHI in 2010, we developed a revised
version of our index, PE2. This time, we attributed equal weights (of 1/3) to each
dimension, and weighted each component by the reciprocal of the number of components
within the dimension. For instance, the “Health” dimension includes three components,
20CODEV, which stands for Companies and Development, is a research program within ESSEC
IRENE. It aims to study the extent to which, and under what criteria, companies can contribute
to the sustainable development of the areas in which they operate, especially in regions of great
poverty and social fragility. For more information, see https://sites.google.com/a/essec.edu/
essec-irene-english/presentation
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each of which weighs 1/3× 1/3 = 1/9 in the index.
The RCI we use in this section is the one described above (see Table 5 for a definition
of the specific cutoffs we used in Nigeria).
Dimension Component Labels Cutoff
Employment empstat 1 if working/student
status 0 if otherwise
Integration Access to transport 1 if good,
to networks transportation 0 if otherwise
(IN) Access to tele 1 if owns a phone
telecommunications 0 if not
Access to information 1 if listens to radio/reads newspaper/watches TV every day
information 0 if else
Number of people hhsize 1 if lives with other people
in the household 0 if lives alone
Family ties famties 1 if perceives that at least one family member loves them
0 if otherwise
Private Number of closefriends 1 if at least one
relations close friends 0 if none
(PR) Financial support finfriend 1 if can borrow from at least 1 person outside the household
0 if not
Trust/unity trustcomm 1 if social unity of the village is defined as a partnership,
in the community 0 if otherwise
Membership membership 1 if member of at least one group
0 if not
Collective action collective 1 if the group works with other groups in the community
0 if not
Civic Vote vote 1 if voted at least once in the last 6 elections
commitment 0 if otherwise
(CV) Solidarity solidarity 1 if participates in community activities regularly/occasionally
0 if once or never
Trust in others trustother 1 if thinks most people can be trusted
0 if not
Table 5: RCI definition in Nigeria
The field work was conducted in the two Nigerian regions of Onelga and Eastern
Obolo. The first has been benefiting from greater corporate engagement since Total
launched an upgrade project in this region, which resulted in more jobs and contracts
compared to in Eastern Obolo, where just a few projects have been supported by oil
companies since 2008.
In Nigeria, oil production dates back to 1958. The oil sector is the greatest contrib-
utor to the national budget—up to 77% of revenues in 2010 (IMF, 2011)—but early in
the last decade, Nigeria ranked as either the most corrupt or the second most corrupt
country (Transparency International, 2004) in the Corruption Perception Index. Cor-
ruption deprives citizens of resources designed for development, and allows a handful of
the elite to confiscate common resources, resulting in acute inequalities. Oil companies
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may be seen as paying huge taxes that never reach local communities, thereby reinforcing
inequalities within the society.
Since the riots of the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 2005), the government has asked
oil companies to directly fund socio-economic programs within communities. Since then,
company relations with communities are managed under Memoranda of Understanding
(MoUs) signed under the supervision of the government. MoUs are non-legally-binding
commitments towards host communities, wherein companies agree to spend a share of
their revenue, on road construction, health and educational infrastructures, and edu-
cation; most of these expenditures are tax-deductible. The companies also provide jobs
and vocational training opportunities aimed at engaging people in self income-generating
activities. In return, communities agree to guarantee peace and an uninterrupted con-
tinuation of oil operations, and to participate in the implementation of development
projects. In this regard, in 2010, Shell dedicated $65m to the MoU package, while Total
and Chevron contributed $50m each. However, this model raises many issues, mostly
related to clientelism and corruption.
Two surveys were led, one in 2008 and one in 2012, in two areas directly and indi-
rectly impacted by oil production: the Onelga Local Government Area, in Rivers State,
where Total and Agip have been operating since the 60s; and the Eastern Obolo Local
Government Area, in Akwa Ibom State, which is impacted by offshore oil production.
In Eastern Obolo, between 2003 and 2009, Total sponsored an NGO, Pro-Natura Inter-
national, that has set up a Local Development Foundation (EOCDF) aimed at fostering
local development. Since 2009, under an MoU signed with Akwa Ibom State, Total has
provided funding to the State, which is supposed to be distributed to Eastern Obolo
LGA and to other coastal LGAs. The amounts of money spent by Total in Eastern
Obolo are very small ($350,000 per year), compared to the $50m spent by the company
in its onshore production site in Onelga.
Our surveys enable a comparison between the two areas—onshore (Onelga) and
coastal (Eastern Obolo)—as well as a comparison between the communities impacted
by different oil companies (Total and Agip) in the onshore area (Onelga). In the two
areas, the contribution of local authorities to local development is minimal. The field
work aimed to compare the situation in the two areas, in terms of both material well-
being and relational capabilities, and to see whether the direct funding of oil companies
to local communities has contributed to improving the quality of the social fabric. The
results concerning the two zones are presented here.
5.2.2 Results
The results obtained from the computation of RCI and RDI in Nigeria are presented
in Tables 6 and 8, respectively. Tables 7 and 9 present the synthetic indexes we obtain
by multiplying the intensity and the extent of poverty for RCI and for RDI, respectively
21.
21 More precisely, in order to obtain indexes that all read the same way, and are increasing with
capabilities for RCI and with deprivations for RDI, we compute the synthetic index on RCI by multiplying
the share of non-poor by the different RCI indexes, and the synthetic index on RDI by multiplying the
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RCI Measure Notation Obolo Obolo Onelga Onelga
2008 2012 2008 2012
Share of poor Np/N 24% 18% 46% 28%
Arithmetic mean RCIa 0.62 0.67 0.56 0.69
Geometric mean RCIg 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.72
Utilitarian index RCIu 1.11 1.23 0.97 1.28
Rawlsian index RCIr 0.28 0.46 0.20 0.60
Anonymous index RCId 1.00 1.14 0.90 1.21
N 620 519 598 486
Table 6: RCI computation for Nigeria
Synthetic Relational Obolo Obolo Onelga Onelga
Capabilities Index 2008 2012 2008 2012
Arithmetic RCIa × (1−Np/N) 0.471 0.552 0.304 0.500
Geometric RCIg × (1−Np/N) 0.509 0.584 0.334 0.522
Utilitarian RCIu × (1−Np/N) 0.844 1.016 0.520 0.923
Rawlsian RCIr × (1−Np/N) 0.216 0.378 0.107 0.436
Anonymous RCId × (1−Np/N) 0.757 0.939 0.485 0.878
N 620 519 598 486
Table 7: Synthetic indexes on the intensity and extent of capabilities
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Four main conclusions can be drawn from these results:
Relational poverty declined in both areas between 2008 and 2012, in terms
of extent as well as intensity. In other words, there are fewer poor people (the first
lines of Tables 6 and 8 show that the share of the poor decreased by 6 percentage points
in Obolo and by 18 percentage points in Onelga), and the capabilities of poor people
have increased. This second observation holds no matter which index we consider: for a
given area, lines 2 to 6 of Tables 6 and 8 show that all RCI indexes increase, and all RDI
indexes decrease, between 2008 and 2012.
The extent and intensity of poverty were higher in Onelga than in Obolo in
2008 : the share of poor is equal to 46% in Onelga and 24% in Obolo at this date, and
Tables 6 and 7 show that, whichever version of the RCI we consider, it is higher in Obolo
(third column) than in Onelga (fifth column). The reverse observation holds for RDI in
Tables 8 and 9, meaning that the deprivations were greater in Onelga than in Obolo in
2008.
The increase of capabilities has been stronger in Onelga than in Obolo during
the period under study. The decrease in the share of poor is greater in proportion
in Onelga than in Obolo, and the variation in the intensity of poverty between 2008 and
2012 is more pronounced in Onelga, whichever index we consider. In 2012, poor people in
Onelga even seem to be slightly less deprived than poor people in Obolo (RDI measures
were all higher in Obolo in 2012). Nonetheless, the extent of poverty, as measured by
the share of poor people in the population, is still much higher in Onelga than in Obolo.
Our synthetic indexes point out that relational deprivation was still higher in
Onelga than in Eastern Obolo in 2012 . Indeed, the previous conclusion allows us
to interpret this observation in more detail: among the two components of the synthetic
index, poverty extent was higher in Onelga, whereas poverty intensity was higher in
Obolo in 2012. What the synthetic index tells us is that the gap in poverty extent more
than compensated for the difference in poverty intensity, leading the synthetic index to
indicate greater deprivations in Onelga.
It is interesting to point out that the last observation would not be noticable if we were
measuring capabilities using simple averages for the whole population; this highlights one
of the areas in which our indexes are of particular use.
share of poor by the RDI indexes.
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RDI Measure Notation Obolo Obolo Onelga Onelga
2008 2012 2008 2012
Share of poor Np/N 24% 18% 46% 28%
Arithmetic mean RDIa 0.38 0.33 0.44 0.31
Geometric mean RDIg 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.28
Utilitarian index RDIu 0.40 0.34 0.48 0.33
Rawlsian index RDIr 1.39 1.00 1.71 0.79
Anonymous index RDId 0.46 0.39 0.52 0.35
N 620 519 598 486
Table 8: RDI computation for Nigeria
Synthetic Relational Obolo Obolo Onelga Onelga
Deprivation Index 2008 2012 2008 2012
Arithmetic RDIa ×Np/N 0.091 0.058 0.201 0.085
Geometric RDIg ×Np/N 0.079 0.051 0.176 0.077
Utilitarian RDIu ×Np/N 0.096 0.060 0.221 0.090
Rawlsian RDIr ×Np/N 0.335 0.175 0.789 0.219
Anonymous RDId ×Np/N 0.111 0.068 0.241 0.097
N 620 519 598 486
Table 9: Synthetic indexes on the intensity and extent of deprivations
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5.3 Computation of the RDI at a national level using Afrobarometer
dataset
5.3.1 Presentation of the data
We compute our RCI and RDI using the Afrobarometer dataset. Afrobarometer is
a comparative dataset which aims to measure the social, political and economic environ-
ment of several African countries. We use the Afrobarometer Round 4 surveys, which
took place in 20 countries22 between March 2008 and June 2009. We present in Table
10 the questions and thresholds we used in our index computation. More references on
each question are available in the Afrobarometer codebook (ICPSR, 2009).
We test robustness to poverty cutoffs, as recommended by Alkire and Santos (2010).
The last two columns of Table 10 present the thresholds we tested at the component level,
using a Student test. Considering the whole sample or each country leads to the same
results: the differences are non-significant at a 5% level. Moreover, we ran a Spearman
test to compare the second index to the first ranking, and, even though some slight
changes occurred in the second ranking, this ranking is no different from the first one.
We find a Spearman’s ρ of -0.82, significant at a 1% level. Hence, our index is robust
to poverty cutoffs at the component level. Future work should include testing different
dimensional poverty cutoffs.
The results from our tests are not presented in this paper but are available upon
request. In the rest of this section, we present results corresponding to the Extensive
thresholds (last column of Table 10).
Dimensions Components Code Threshold 1 Threshold 2
(Restrictive) (Extensive)
Integration to network Employment status Q94 4, 5 2, 3, 4, 5
Access to transport EA:ROAD 1 1
Access to telecommunications Q88A 4 4, 3
Access to information Q 12 B 4 4, 3
Private relations Number of people in the household ADULT:CT More than 2 More than 1
Family ties Q84A 3 3
Close friends, emotional support Missing
Financial support Missing
Trust in the community Q84B 3 3, 2
Civic commitment Membership Q22A 3 3, 2
Collective action Q23A 4 4, 3, 2
Vote Q23D 1 1, 2
Solidarity Q22B 3 2, 3
Trust in others Q84C 3 2, 3
Table 10: Index dimensions and components
22Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
43
5.3.2 Results
The results we obtain from the computation of RDI on the Afrobarometer dataset are
presented in Tables 11 to 13. We also computed RCI but do not display the results
in the present paper, for comprehensibility. They are available upon request. Table 11
presents the RDI incidence and intensity according to the different versions of the index
we defined in section 4, with the values and rankings for each country. Table 12 confronts
the RDI results and rankings with those of material poverty indices: MPI and GDP per
capita. Table 13 details the RDI scores and rankings by dimension. Four main results
are worth mentioning here.
Share of poor Intensity
Country N (Incidence) Arith. Geom. Utilitarian Anonymous Rawlsian
Benin 1187 77 % (2) 0.60 0.55 0.80 (1) 0.84 (1) 2.91 (1)
Botswana 1198 70 % (7) 0.56 0.51 0.71 (6) 0.75 (5) 2.91 (1)
Burkina Faso 1181 65 % (9) 0.58 0.53 0.75 (4) 0.83 (2) 2.91 (1)
Cape Verde 1232 58 % (12) 0.54 0.49 0.67 (11) 0.66 (15) 2.67 (15)
Ghana 1199 49 % (17) 0.49 0.44 0.57 (18) 0.60 (18) 2.34 (19)
Kenya 1071 55 % (13) 0.49 0.43 0.57 (18) 0.60 (18) 2.91 (1)
Lesotho 1198 78 % (1) 0.59 0.54 0.77 (2) 0.80 (3) 2.91 (1)
Liberia 1197 71 % (6) 0.55 0.49 0.68 (9) 0.73 (8) 2.91 (1)
Madagascar 1347 74 % (3) 0.58 0.54 0.77 (2) 0.79 (4) 2.91 (1)
Malawi 1181 73 % (4) 0.53 0.47 0.64 (15) 0.70 (10) 2.91 (1)
Mali 1231 47 % (18) 0.56 0.51 0.72 (5) 0.75 (5) 2.67 (15)
Mozambique 1191 73 % (5) 0.55 0.50 0.69 (7) 0.70 (10) 2.91 (1)
Namibia 1200 51 % (16) 0.55 0.50 0.69 (7) 0.74 (7) 2.67 (15)
Nigeria 2324 54 % (14) 0.53 0.47 0.64 (15) 0.68 (13) 2.91 (1)
Senegal 1178 37 % (20) 0.48 0.44 0.58 (17) 0.62 (17) 1.92 (20)
South Africa 2400 52 % (15) 0.53 0.48 0.65 (12) 0.69 (12) 2.67 (15)
Tanzania 1208 38 % (19) 0.46 0.41 0.53 (20) 0.54 (20) 2.91 (1)
Uganda 2429 61 % (11) 0.54 0.48 0.65 (12) 0.68 (13) 2.91 (1)
Zambia 1184 64 % (10) 0.53 0.49 0.65 (12) 0.66 (15) 2.91 (1)
Zimbabwe 1164 66 % (8) 0.55 0.49 0.68 (9) 0.72 (9) 2.91 (1)
Note: In Benin, 77% of the sample is relationally deprived according to our definition of relational
poverty, which ranks the country 2nd in relational deprivation incidence. Among these relationally
deprived people, the arithmetic mean of deprivations is 0.60 and the geometric mean, 0.55.
The Utilitarian (respectively: Anonymous, Rawlsian) index defined in section 5.1.3 is 0.80
(respectively: 0.84, 2.91), which ranks the country first in relational deprivation intensity.
Table 11: RDI Computation
Relational poverty incidence and intensity bring complementary information.
Table 11 shows that the rankings in terms of share of poor are different from those in
terms of relational deprivation intensity. For example, Mali, which ranks among the
least deprived countries (18th position) in terms of RDI incidence, is among the poorest
countries in terms of intensity (5th position in intensity with anonymous weighting). In
other words, relationally poor people are not very numerous in Mali (less than half of the
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sample) but the situation of these poor people is worse than the situation of poor people
in other countries. An opposite example would be the case of Malawi: there are a lot of
relationally poor people (73%, which ranks the country 4th) but poor people are better
off than in other countries (Malawi ranks 15th in intensity with utilitarian weighting and
10th with anonymous weighting).
The theory of justice we use as a conceptual framework has consequences
on our results. We see in Table 11 that rankings are not robust to the different
versions of the index—Utilitarian, Anonymous or Rawlsian—we computed. For instance,
while relationally poor people are overall less deprived in Tanzania than in Senegal (the
respective rankings of these countries are 20th and 17th according to the utilitarian and
anonymous weightings), the most deprived person in Tanzania is relationally poorer than
the most deprived person in Senegal (Tanzania ranks among the first 14 countries while
Senegal ranks last in ‘Rawlsian’ intensity).
However, it is worth noting that some countries are robust to the different types of
rankings: this is the case, for instance, of Benin, Ghana, Senegal or Lesotho. It is also
worth mentioning that Rawlsian intensity scores are the same for 14 countries. A score
of 2.91 corresponds to the case where the poorest person is deprived in all 4 components
of the first dimension, all 3 components of the second, and 4 over 5 components of
the third dimension, associated with the dimensional weight vectors (1/2, 1/4, 1/4) or
(1/4, 1/2, 1/4). The scores of 2.67 and 2.34 also correspond to cases in which the poorest
individual is fully deprived in two dimensions and has only one achievement on the last
dimension (the dimension where they are not fully deprived being respectively Dim. 1
and Dim. 2). In our sample, over 20 countries, there are thus 19 countries where the
poorest person has only one achievement over the 12 we used to compute RDI. The
remaining country, Senegal, has a score of 1.92 which reflects two achievements over the
12 components.
Indeed, the three versions of the index that we presented in this section are just
examples of coherent indices as defined in section 4. Other versions of the RDI can and
should be computed, for instance, with Dirac weighting on dimensions, or with different
individual weights according to socio-demographic characteristics. We aim to do so in
future work, and these first results confirm the relevance of using different weights.
For comprehensibility, we only present in the following tables (Tables 12 and 13)
results corresponding to the ‘Anonymous’ version of our index.
Our relational index adds information to the main economic development
indexes. Table 12 shows that rankings for MPI and RDI differ, both in incidence,
intensity and score (incidence*intensity). One should however be careful in interpreting
these results, since the different indexes compared in this table were not computed the
same year. Thus, our comparaisons are only indicative and additional data would be
necessary to better conclude on material and relational poverty.
The examples of Mali and Lesotho reveal that material and relational deprivation
are complementary. In Lesotho, there are many relationally poor people (Share of poor
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Country Share Share GDP per RDI MPI score RDI score
of poor RDI of Poor MPI capita (Anonymous)
Lesotho 78% (1) 35.3% (16)f 796 0.80 0.156 (16) 0.624 (2)
Benin 77% (2) 71.8 % (7)c 766 0.84 0.412 (6) 0.647 (1)
Madagascar 74% (3) 66.9% (8)f 422 0.79 0.357 (8) 0.585 (3)
Mozambique 73% (4) 79.3% (4)f 423 0.70 0.512 (3) 0.511 (7)
Malawi 73% (5) 72.1% (6)a 348 0.70 0.334 (9) 0.505 (8)
Liberia 71% (6) 83.9% (2)d 301 0.73 0.485 (4) 0.518 (6)
Botswana 70% (7) NA 5 822 0.75 NA 0.525 (5)
Zimbabwe 66% (8) 39.7% (14)c 492 0.72 0.172 (15) 0.475 (9)
Burkina Faso 65% (9) 82.6% (3)c 522 0.83 0.535 (2) 0.539 (4)
Zambia 64% (10) 64.2% (11)d 1006 0.66 0.328 (11) 0.422 (10)
Uganda 61% (11) 72.3% (5)c 488 0.68 0.367 (7) 0.415 (11)
Cape Verde 58% (12) NA 3 256 0.66 NA 0.383 (12)
Kenya 55% (13) 47.8% (13)f 775 0.60 0.229 (13) 0.330 (17)
Nigeria 54% (14) 54.1% (12)e 1 091 0.68 0.310 (12) 0.367 (14)
South Africa 52% (15) 13.4% (18)e 5 738 0.69 0.057 (18) 0.359 (15)
Namibia 51% (16) 39.6% (15)d 3983 0.74 0.187 (14) 0.377 (13)
Ghana 49% (17) 31.2% (17)e 1090 0.60 0.144 (17) 0.294 (18)
Mali 47% (18) 86.6% (1)c 601 0.75 0.558 (1) 0.353 (16)
Tanzania 38% (19) 65.2% (10)e 506 0.54 0.332 (10) 0.205 (19)
Senegal 37% (20) 66.9% (8)b 1 055 0.62 0.439 (5) 0.223 (20)
Rank in brackets. GDP per capita (World Bank, 2009) : current US dollars. Years of computation
of the MPI are indicated by exponents: a2004; b2005; c2006; d2007; e2008; f2009.
Note: In Lesotho, 78% of the sample is relationally deprived according to our definition of relational
poverty, which ranks the country 1st. RDI incidence is 0.80, and RDI score (intensity*incidence)
is 0.624, which ranks the country 2nd in relational poverty. As for material poverty, 35.3% of the
inhabitants of Lesotho are materially deprived as measured by the MPI in 2009, which ranks the
country 16th in MPI incidence. MPI score is 0.156 which ranks the country 16th in material poverty.
GDP per capita is $796.
Table 12: Ranking comparaisons
of 78% and 1st rank in relational deprivation incidence) and those who are deprived are
very deprived, leading to the second highest RDI score of our sample; but Lesotho also
has quite low MPI share of poor and score (respectively 35% and 0.156, which ranks it
16th among the 18 countries for which information is available). On the contrary, Mali is
one of the least relationally deprived countries of our sample (it ranks 18th in incidence
and 16th in score) but is the materially poorest country among the 18 for which MPI is
available.
Though we will not detail it here, the same observation holds for RDI and GDP per
capita.
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RDI Country RDI Incidence Poor share by dimension RDI Intensity Intensity by dimension
Rank Score (rank) Dimension Score (rank) Score (rank) Dimension Score (rank)
Networks 96% (4) Networks 0.42 (8)
1 Benin 77% (2) Private relations 82% (3) 0.84 (1) Private relations 0.33 (1)
Civic engagement 97% (3) Civic engagement 0.44 (7)
Networks 97% (1) Networks 0.35 (5)
2 Lesotho 78% (1) Private relations 84% (2) 0.80 (3) Private relations 0.40 (5)
Civic engagement 94% (12) Civic engagement 0.47 (12)
Networks 87% (12) Networks 0.43 (9)
3 Madagascar 74% (3) Private relations 87% (1) 0.79 (4) Private relations 0.42 (6)
Civic engagement 99% (1) Civic engagement 0.40 (4)
Networks 96% (5) Networks 0.35 (4)
4 Burkina Faso 65% (9) Private relations 69% (15) 0.83 (2) Private relations 0.47 (11)
Civic engagement 97% (4) Civic engagement 0.44 (9)
Networks 87% (11) Networks 0.50 (12)
5 Botswana 70% (7) Private relations 81% (4) 0.75 (5) Private relations 0.37 (2)
Civic engagement 96% (6) Civic engagement 0.45 (11)
Networks 96% (6) Networks 0.34 (1)
6 Liberia 71% (6) Private relations 77% (9) 0.73 (8) Private relations 0.46 (10)
Civic engagement 91% (15) Civic engagement 0.56 (18)
Networks 92% (9) Networks 0.41 (7)
7 Mozambique 73% (5) Private relations 81% (6) 0.70 (11) Private relations 0.50 (16)
Civic engagement 96% (8) Civic engagement 0.44 (10)
Networks 97% (2) Networks 0.34 (2)
8 Malawi 73% (4) Private relations 81% (5) 0.70 (10) Private relations 0.52 (17)
Civic engagement 91% (16) Civic engagement 0.55 (17)
Networks 93% (8) Networks 0.34 (3)
9 Zimbabwe 66% (8) Private relations 75% (12) 0.72 (9) Private relations 0.49 (14)
Civic engagement 96% (10) Civic engagement 0.52 (15)
Networks 91% (10) Networks 0.43 (10)
10 Zambia 64% (10) Private relations 76% (11) 0.66 (16) Private relations 0.48 (13)
Civic engagement 91% (17) Civic engagement 0.50 (14)
Networks 85% (15) Networks 0.49 (11)
11 Uganda 61% (11) Private relations 77% (10) 0.68 (14) Private relations 0.42 (7)
Civic engagement 92% (14) Civic engagement 0.48 (13)
Networks 76% (18) Networks 0.56 (18)
12 Cape Verde 58% (12) Private relations 74% (13) 0.66 (15) Private relations 0.50 (15)
Civic engagement 98% (2) Civic engagement 0.33 (1)
Networks 84% (16) Networks 0.52 (14)
13 Namibia 51% (16) Private relations 60% (17) 0.74 (7) Private relations 0.47 (12)
Civic engagement 97% (5) Civic engagement 0.35 (2)
Networks 73% (19) Networks 0.59 (19)
14 Nigeria 54% (14) Private relations 78% (8) 0.68 (13) Private relations 0.39 (3)
Civic engagement 95% (11) Civic engagement 0.44 (8)
Networks 68% (20) Networks 0.61 (20)
15 South Africa 52% (15) Private relations 79% (7) 0.69 (12) Private relations 0.39 (4)
Civic engagement 96% (9) Civic engagement 0.40 (3)
Networks 97% (3) Networks 0.36 (6)
16 Mali 47% (18) Private relations 50% (19) 0.75 (6) Private relations 0.52 (18)
Civic engagement 96% (7) Civic engagement 0.43 (6)
Networks 85% (13) Networks 0.54 (15)
17 Kenya 55% (13) Private relations 71% (14) 0.60 (19) Private relations 0.43 (8)
Civic engagement 87% (18) Civic engagement 0.57 (19)
Networks 82% (17) Networks 0.55 (17)
18 Ghana 49% (17) Private relations 69% (16) 0.60 (18) Private relations 0.46 (9)
Civic engagement 86% (19) Civic engagement 0.54 (16)
Networks 85% (14) Networks 0.50 (13)
19 Tanzania 38% (19) Private relations 52% (18) 0.54 (20) Private relations 0.54 (19)
Civic engagement 81% (20) Civic engagement 0.59 (20)
Networks 93% (7) Networks 0.54 (16)
20 Senegal 37% (20) Private relations 41% (20) 0.62 (17) Private relations 0.59 (20)
Civic engagement 92% (13) Civic engagement 0.42 (5)
RDI Rank and Intensity are computed using ‘Anonymous’ rankings.
Note: In Benin, 77% of the sample is relationally deprived according to our definition of relational poverty, which ranks the
country 2nd in relational deprivation incidence. 96% (82%, 97%) of the sample is deprived in dim. 1 (respectively: 2, 3)
which ranks Benin 4th (3rd) in the proportion of people deprived in dim. 1 (respectively: 2, 3).
Among the 77% of relationally deprived people, the intensity of relational deprivations (using anonymous weightings) is 0.84
which ranks the country 1st, the intensity of deprivations in dim. 1 (respectively: 2, 3) is 0.42 (respectively: 0.33, 0.44)
which ranks the country 8th (respectively: 1st, 7th).
Table 13: Rank comparaisons by dimensions
Our three dimensions play a different role in the determination of the scores
and rankings. Table 13 details the incidence and intensity of relational deprivation at
the dimension level. Poor shares by dimension represent the proportion of people who
have a relational score under the dimensional threshold (equal to 1 in this paper), for a
given dimension. As a reminder, someone is considered as relationally non-deprived if
he is not deprived in any of our three dimensions. Intensity by dimension represent the
average score in each dimension among the people who are deprived for RDI (and not
just in the corresponding dimension).
The results show that whereas more people are deprived in the first and the third
dimensions (respectively: integration into networks and civic engagement) than in the
second one (private relations), there is no significant difference—in terms of both mean
and standard deviation—in the countries’ intensity of relational deprivation between the
three dimensions.
Though detailed comments about the global and dimensional scores by country will
not be provided in this paper, they should be an object of further research.
5.3.3 Interpretation regarding Englebert’s concept of State Legitimacy
Focusing on political economy of African countries sheds particular light on our re-
sults. Trust in institutions is expected to impact directly “trust in others”, one component
of the “civic commitment” dimension. Moreover, it might also have an indirect influence
on other components, such as trust in the community, membership and collective action.
Englebert (2000) stresses the relationship between state as a structure and society as
a whole of individuals through the concept of state legitimacy (see Bratton and Chang
(2006) for a review). State legitimacy is “a structural variable determined by history:
a state is deemed legitimate when it has evolved endogenously to local social relations
of power and authority or when, having originally been imported, it is then absorbed by
such preexisting endogenous institutions.” (Englebert, 2000, p.72). Empirically, two key
dimensions define legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy refers to the endogeneity of state and
society. Indeed, state in Africa is often inherited from the colonization period. When
appropriated by new elite, it is more or less consistent with a background of preexisting
institutions23. Horizontal legitimacy is defined as the ethnic fragmentation inside the
country, i.e. an index of the consistency of borders definition, or the extent to which
there is agreement about what constitutes the polity or the community that comprises
the state.
African legitimate states are better leviathans, enforce property rights, have better
institutions. Consequently, they are trusted by their citizens. Hence, we expect a positive
correlation between state legitimacy and relational capability, such as an absolute value
close to 1. Empirically, we obtain mitigated results, with a Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient (rho) of 0.47 significant at a 95% level between horizontal legitimacy and RDI
score. The Spearman rho between vertical legitimacy and RDI score is 0.41, significant
23States that are endogenous to societies are Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sao Tomé
and Principe, Swaziland and Lesotho, Botswana and to a less extent Rwanda and Burundi
48
at 90 %. For instance, the correlation is high for Benin, where RDI score is 0.647 and
which has a low state legitimacy : the state is not vertically legitimate, and its horizontal
legitimacy score is only 67%, below the lower bound of 75%. However, the discrepancy
between the two indicators is remarkable. As an example, Botswana is a vertical legiti-
mate state, and has a 90.53% horizontal legitimacy. However, its 0.525 RDI score is one
of the largest of the sample, i.e. its deprivation rate is high. Further investigation is
required to assess the link between state legitimacy and relational capacity.
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